The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards by Cremers, K.J. Martijn & Sepe, Simone M.
   
67 
ARTICLE 
The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards 
K.J. Martijn Cremers* & Simone M. Sepe** 
Abstract. In the last decade, the balance of power between shareholders and boards has 
shifted dramatically. Changes in both the marketplace and the legal landscape governing it 
have turned the call for empowered shareholders into a new reality. Correspondingly, the 
authority that boards of directors have historically held in U.S. corporate law has been 
eroded. Empirical studies associating staggered boards with lower firm value have been 
interpreted to favor this shift of authority, supporting the view that protecting boards 
from shareholder pressure is detrimental to shareholder interests. 
This Article presents new empirical evidence on staggered boards that not only exposes 
the limitations of prior empirical studies, but also, and more importantly, suggests the 
opposite conclusion. Employing a unique and comprehensive dataset covering thirty-four 
years of board staggering and destaggering decisions—from 1978 to 2011—we show that 
staggered boards are associated with a statistically and economically significant increase in 
firm value. In light of these novel empirical results, we then show theoretically that a 
corporate model with staggered boards emerges as a rational institutional response to 
market imperfections that are more complex and more significant than shareholder 
advocates have realized. Boards that retain their historical authority—empowered 
boards—benefit, rather than hurt, shareholders. This Article concludes with a normative 
proposal to revitalize the authority of U.S. boards. 
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Introduction 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, America invented the most 
successful business model of all time: corporate capitalism.1 At the center of 
that economic success was the “management corporation.”2 As the name 
suggests, management corporations revolved around managers—salaried, 
professional executives—brought in to “hire capital from the investor.”3 
Underlying this arrangement was a “tacit societal consensus” that corporate 
growth took priority over corporate profits,4 as long as managers could 
compensate their shareholders with stable dividends—a goal they successfully 
accomplished.5 Corporate law accommodated the development of this business 
model, privileging a board-centric system under which firm insiders—
directors and managers—retained virtually exclusive authority over the 
corporation. Unlike in capitalistic models elsewhere, such as in the United 
Kingdom, American shareholders have historically been relegated to the role 
of spectators, with only a limited capacity to intervene in corporate affairs.6 
However, starting in the late 1970s through the early 1980s, and with 
increasing intensity in the 2000s, a competing corporate model has gained 
popularity.7 This model is conceptually built on the idea of “shareholder 
empowerment,” with enhanced shareholder governance rights, and 
correspondingly weakened board authority.8 Economically, the case for 
 
 1. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 8 (1977) (“[O]nce a managerial hierarchy had been formed and had 
successfully carried out its function of administrative coordination, the hierarchy itself 
became a source of permanence, power, and continued growth.”).  
 2. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) (describing the appearance, success, 
and endurance of the management corporation). 
 3. Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489 (1958). 
 4. See Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68   
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1646 (2011); see also Bratton, supra note 2, at 1492-93. 
 5. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and 
Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (2010) (“The deployment of diverse investors’ 
capital by expert centralized management has been a major contributor to America’s 
wealth.”).  
 6. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: 
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 36-37 (2013) (comparing the 
historical role of shareholders in the U.K. and U.S. corporate law models).  
 7. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 1649 (describing the replacement of “patient capital” with 
“impatient capital”). 
 8. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 662 (2010) (“[T]he board’s decisionmaking power 
[under the shareholder empowerment model] stems from the shareholders’ delegation 
of that power. It follows that what the shareholders delegate they should also be able to 
withdraw.”). 
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shareholder empowerment rests on the assumption that shareholders, as the 
corporation’s residual claimants, are better placed than boards, which may be 
captured by opportunistic management, to provide value-enhancing 
governance input. Recent changes in both the legal landscape and the 
marketplace have rewarded the efforts of shareholder advocates, with the 
result that empowered shareholders are no longer merely an aspiration but a 
reality in today’s corporate environment.9  
The rise of shareholder power has revitalized the debate on staggered 
boards, a longstanding and central issue in the confrontation between 
shareholder advocates and traditionalists who defend the board-centric model. 
With a staggered board, directors are grouped into different classes (usually 
three) such that each class of directors stands for reelection in successive years. 
Because this board structure requires challengers to win at least two election 
cycles to gain a board majority, a staggered board helps to protect directors 
from the threat of early removal by shareholders.  
Board advocates defend staggered boards as a means of protecting board 
authority against short-term shareholder and market pressures, thereby 
promoting long-term value creation.10 In the view of shareholder advocates, 
however, the staggered board is undesirable because it diminishes the 
accountability of directors and the managers they oversee, and thus encourages 
managerial moral hazard.11 In the past decade, this belief has garnered 
sufficient support such that shareholder advocates now hold the upper hand, 
emboldened by empirical evidence suggesting that the adoption of a staggered 
board is detrimental to firm value.12 In light of this evidence, they have 
concluded that “insulation advocates”—as they have dubbed defenders of board 
authority13—should surrender to the view that enhancing shareholder power 
moves corporate governance in an efficient direction,14 unless they can expose 
flaws in current empirical research and “counter[] it with research that avoids 
such flaws.”15 
This Article meets that challenge by presenting new empirical evidence on 
staggered boards that not only exposes the limitations of prior empirical 
 
 9. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part I.C.1.  
 13. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2013). As observed by the Delaware Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., the term “insulation advocate,” which has an inherently 
negative connotation, “create[s] an intellectual straw man . . . to burn down easily.” Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors?: A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling 
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450-51 (2014). 
 14. See Strine, supra note 13, at 460.  
 15. Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1667-68.  
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studies, but also, and more importantly, suggests the opposite conclusion.16 
Employing a unique and comprehensive dataset covering thirty-four years of 
staggering and destaggering decisions—from 1978 to 2011—we document that 
staggered boards are associated with a statistically and economically significant 
increase in firm value.17 In light of these novel empirical results, we then take 
up the additional challenge of providing a theoretical account of the merits of 
“empowered boards” that can resist short-term shareholder and market 
pressures. These empowered boards may be staggered, but the term more 
broadly refers to any board that retains the authority U.S. boards historically 
had in the received legal model. Combining insights from general equilibrium 
theory18 and contract theory,19 we show that a corporate model with 
empowered boards—the same model that was key to the enduring success of 
American corporate capitalism—emerges as a rational institutional response to 
market imperfections that are more complex and more significant than 
shareholder advocates generally realize.  
Following the recommendations of staggered board critics, this Article 
begins its analysis by revisiting prior cross-sectional studies on staggered 
boards and “tak[ing] the empirical evidence seriously.”20 These studies associate 
board staggering with lower firm value and take that association as evidence 
for the claim that board staggering is a causal antecedent to managerial moral 
hazard. Sound empirical methods, however, must reduce the possibility of 
correlation being mistaken for causation. Despite their enormous influence, 
cross-sectional studies on staggered boards are limited in their ability to address 
this concern. Because of the limited amount of data available, these studies are 
constrained to a comparison of the association between the level of firm value 
and the level of staggering provisions across different firms.21 As a result, these 
studies cannot affirmatively exclude the possibility that differences in firm 
value might be attributable to differences in firm characteristics other than 
 
 16. The empirical evidence presented in this Article is partly based on a companion 
finance article that we recently coauthored, along with Lubomir Litov. K.J. Martijn 
Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Firm Value, 
Revisited (1July 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2364165.  
 17. As standard in the empirical literature, both prior cross-sectional studies and our own 
use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of 
Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 419 (2005) (observing that Tobin’s Q has become 
a commonly recognized proxy for market valuation). Tobin’s Q is, roughly, the ratio of 
the market value of assets to the book value of assets. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. 
French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002). 
 18. See infra Part III.A.  
 19. See infra Part III.C.  
 20. Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1668. 
 21. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 
444-45 (4th ed. 2009) (describing cross-sectional analysis).  
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having a staggered board (a “specification” problem), or that low firm value 
might motivate, rather than result from, the adoption of a staggered board (a 
“simultaneity,” or “reverse causality,” problem).22  
Whereas the 1995-2002 time period that has been the focus of many prior 
studies exhibits comparatively little variation in staggering or destaggering 
activity, our 1978-2011 sample considers a significantly larger number of 
changes in board structures. This expanded dataset allows us to more 
accurately interpret the relationship between staggered boards and firm value 
by applying a time-series analysis23 that employs firm fixed effects. Including 
firm fixed effects is equivalent to controlling for any and all firm-level 
variables in a dataset that do not change over time, thereby determining what 
change in firm value within the same firms occurred before or after a change in 
board structure.24 
Our analysis delivers striking results. First, in replicating prior cross-
sectional analyses for the period 1995-2002, our results indicate that the 
identified negative association between staggered boards and firm value is not 
as robust as previously suggested. More importantly, the time-series analysis 
documents a strong positive association between staggered boards and firm 
value over both the subperiod of 1995-2002 and the overall sample period of 
1978-2011. Adopting a staggered board (“staggering up”) is associated with a 
statistically and economically significant increase in firm value, while 
decisions to destagger a board (“staggering down”) are associated with a 
corresponding reduction in firm value. This result calls into question the 
interpretation of prior cross-sectional studies. As this Article later illustrates, 
reverse causality explains those previous results. That is, less valuable firms 
seek board protection through staggering provisions (and firm value would go 
up, not down, with the adoption of a staggered board), rather than board 
protection causing firms to become less valuable. 
Having shown that staggered boards add value, the question becomes by 
what mechanism. In addressing this question, it is useful to reconceptualize the 
relationship between the shareholders and the directors and managers as a 
long-term contract under which the shareholders have a right of unilateral 
renegotiation. Indeed, shareholders enjoy the right to both remove incumbents 
 
 22. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL 
DATA 50-51 (2002) (providing a general discussion of the specificity and simultaneity 
problems). 
 23. See id. at 668 (“The time series dimension . . . allows us to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the cross section units, and to estimate certain dynamic 
relationships.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 124-25.  
 24. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & William E. Taylor, Panel Data and Unobservable Individual 
Effects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1377, 1377 (1981) (stating that using fixed effects represents a 
common method of controlling for omitted variables); see also WOOLDRIDGE, supra  
note 21, at 485-86 (explaining how to perform a fixed effect analysis by including a 
dummy for each cross-sectional observation (in our case, for each firm) in a panel).  
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and rapidly exit through the financial markets, which may trigger a change in 
control. Assuming that market prices aggregate information effectively, 
shareholder advocates view these institutional features as providing both an 
efficient ex post response to mismanagement, as signaled by a drop in stock 
performance, and beneficial ex ante disciplinary effects.25 However, this 
account of market mechanisms ignores the possibility that current market 
prices may fail to reflect the long-term fundamental value of a firm, 
notwithstanding this possibility being increasingly likely today due to the 
transformative changes that have occurred in both corporate production and 
capital markets in the recent past.26 Long-term investment in nonstandardized, 
innovative technology—for which more severe information asymmetry 
increases the risk of mispricing—has become a defining feature of the twenty-
first-century corporation.27 Moreover, greater ownership concentration in 
intermediary institutions and the rise of activist hedge funds have increased 
the likelihood of noninformative market-making trades.28 As a result, the 
possibility of speculative pricing cannot be ignored.29 
The combination of asset pricing inefficiency and shareholder 
renegotiation rights produces what we call a “limited-commitment problem.”30 
 
 25. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 113 (1965) (pioneering theoretical assertions that the takeover phenomenon 
constituted efficient market control of the corporation). 
 26. One could argue that while this Article claims that a firm’s market value is not 
necessarily reflective of its fundamentals under the possibility of mispricing, the 
Article’s empirical analysis still uses a measure of market value to estimate the wealth 
impact of staggered boards. However, acknowledging that market value might not be 
an accurate proxy for fundamental value in the short term does not challenge the use 
of market-value metrics for efficiency analysis altogether, as suggested by some 
scholars. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 674 (2006). Rather, as we explain elsewhere, it 
suggests that efficiency claims should rely less on event studies, which focus on short-
term variations in market-value measures, and more on studies that examine changes 
in such measures over the long-term. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & 
Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 21-23) (on file with authors). This Article’s 
ability to rely on long-term changes in market value fulfills that requirement.  
 27. See infra notes 208-09, 231-35 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 29. After the financial crisis, asset pricing models that allow for the possibility of 
mispricing have been the subject of a large body of literature. See generally Darrell 
Duffie, Asset Price Dynamics with Slow-Moving Capital, 65 J. FIN. 1237 (2010) (providing a 
summary of these studies).  
 30. Economically, a limited-commitment problem (typically called a “time inconsistency” 
problem in prior literature) arises each time decisionmakers have incentives to renege 
on prior engagements and the anticipation of this circumstance reduces ex ante 
welfare. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 473-74 (1977) (modeling 
circumstances in which “discretionary policy for which policymakers select the best 
action, given the current situation” may turn out to be ex ante inefficient). The 
footnote continued on next page 
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Shareholders, attempting to maximize the value of their holdings, cannot 
credibly commit to not remove the board or dump their shares upon an early 
drop in performance, as they are unable to distinguish whether that drop is due 
to mismanagement or investment in a project whose value will not be 
immediately realized. This introduces ex ante distortions into corporate 
relationships. For one thing, in order to reduce the likelihood of an early drop 
in performance, directors and managers tend to develop short-termist 
incentives—and much more pervasively than shareholder advocates have 
previously acknowledged.31 Further, a related problem may arise with the 
firm’s other stakeholders, because the value of firm-specific investments might 
be reduced by the shareholders’ ability to seek a change in investment policy or 
rapidly sell shares. Consider, for example, long-term suppliers or large 
customers who are vulnerable to changes in the firm’s operating strategy. 
When shareholders can more easily replace a board or pull out without 
warning, stakeholders may be induced to increase the cost of their corporate 
performance and/or reduce the level of their firm-specific investments, with 
the ultimate result being reduced firm value.  
A governance model with empowered boards that can resist the threat of 
short-term shareholder and market pressures helps to mitigate these 
distortions. It does so by enabling the board to credibly commit the 
shareholders, as a collective, to longer-term engagements vis-à-vis directors, 
managers, and stakeholders, thereby increasing shareholder wealth. This 
theoretical account explains the constructive role of staggered boards informed 
by our time-series analysis.32 Further, it suggests that long-term projects and 
 
enforcement of anti-bailout policies provides a classic example: before a crisis, 
“policymakers understand that expectations of future government support will 
engender moral hazard and other inefficiencies. Ex post, however, the need to avoid 
systemic collapse will induce policymakers to renege on prior promises, especially in 
the case of large (i.e., too big to fail) financial institutions.” Simone M. Sepe, Regulating 
Risk and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian Perspective, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 383 (2012) 
(footnote omitted). Economist Colin Mayer has recently explored the link between 
long-term commitment and the risk of shareholder opportunism, arguing that 
shareholders are unable to commit to the provision of locked-in capital in an active 
market for corporate control. See COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE 
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 145-46 (2013). Lynn 
Stout has also recently investigated the distortions that imperfectly efficient markets 
may engender in shareholder incentives to support long-term corporate projects. Lynn 
A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational 
Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 714-18 (2015). 
 31. For an example of a shareholder advocate underestimating short-termism, see 
Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1643, arguing that “it is far from clear how often” short-
termism concerns arise. 
 32. Consistent with our empirical and theoretical analysis of staggered boards, William 
Johnson, Jonathan Karpoff, and Sangho Yi have recently documented that in IPO 
firms, takeover defenses reduce the possibility that a change in control will harm the 
firm’s stakeholders (such as large customers, suppliers, and strategic partners), thereby 
footnote continued on next page 
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optimal stakeholder investments are the main channels through which a 
staggered board increases firm value—a novel prediction that this Article 
subjects to empirical testing and for which the data yield strong support.  
As to the oft-repeated claim that the benefits of empowered boards come at 
the expense of increased directorial or managerial moral hazard,33 the 
empirical evidence suggests that if such a tradeoff occurs, it does not take place 
at par. On the contrary, the positive time-series association of staggered boards 
with firm value suggests that the value added when shareholders are bound to 
the long-term horizon more than compensates for any potential increase in 
moral hazard costs. Additionally, several instruments remain available to 
constrain the alleged increase in moral hazard triggered by board insulation, 
including well-designed compensation schemes, nominally friendly 
acquisitions, and liability rules.34 No comparable remedies are available to 
mitigate the shareholder limited-commitment problem.  
While this analysis is consistent with the established board-centric model 
of U.S. corporate law, the rise of newly empowered shareholders has begun to 
erode that model. The recent increase in shareholder empowerment 
jeopardizes the board-centric model’s continuing ability to deliver efficient 
outcomes—thus necessitating the reempowerment of corporate boards. 
Consistent with this Article’s theoretical and empirical analyses, we 
recommend legal reform that would transform staggered boards into a quasi-
mandatory rule.35 By reversing the growing trend toward destaggering,36 this 
reform would restore a board’s ability to credibly commit shareholders to long-
term value creation, which is in their own and society’s best interests. 
 
promoting more favorable contracting terms and increasing firm value. William C. 
Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 
J. FIN. ECON. 307, 329 (2015). Elsewhere, we have also documented that firm value 
increases following reincorporation in a state with more (or more severe) antitakeover 
statutes, especially for firms that are more likely to be affected by the limited-
commitment problem (i.e., firms with more investments in long-term projects and 
stronger stakeholder relationships). K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Whither 
Delaware?: Limited Commitment and the Financial Value of Corporate Law 40-41 
(Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2519238. 
 33. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1643 (“[T]o the extent that [short-termism situations] 
do arise often, the question remains whether their expected costs exceed the expected 
benefits from activists’ clear interest in seeking actions that are positive in both the 
short term and the long term.”). 
 34. See infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 
2032, 2087 (2012) (introducing the concept of “sticky defaults,” a type of quasi-
mandatory rule that “attempt[s] to produce a constrained separating equilibrium, 
allowing a reduced number of contractors to opt for legal consequences that 
lawmakers disfavor”). 
 36. See infra Part II.B.  
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides 
background information on the law of staggered boards, the current status of 
the theoretical and empirical debates, and these debates’ impact on corporate 
practices. Part II presents our new time-series analysis of the association 
between staggered boards and firm value. Part III offers our theory of board 
empowerment, which conceptualizes the relationship between shareholders 
and directors as an agency relationship with a salient limited-commitment 
problem. Part IV provides empirical support for our theory’s specific 
predictions that firms with more long-term investments, as well as firms for 
which stakeholder participation is more relevant, would benefit the most from 
having a staggered board. Finally, Part V discusses the policy implications of 
our analysis and makes recommendations to revitalize board authority.  
I. The Staggered Board Debate 
Whether staggered boards are beneficial or inimical to shareholder 
interests is the subject of a longstanding debate, which has generated a large 
body of theoretical and empirical literature and shows no signs of waning. This 
debate has captured the attention of directors, managers, investors, and proxy 
advisory firms who share obvious incentives to care about the “value” of 
staggered boards. This Part provides the background necessary for 
understanding the context and importance of this debate: an account of the law 
of staggered boards, an overview of existing theoretical and empirical 
literature, and a discussion of relevant corporate practices. 
A. Institutional Background  
Virtually all U.S. states allow companies to choose between a unitary and a 
staggered (or classified) board structure.37 Under the former, all directors stand 
for reelection at each annual shareholder meeting.38 In contrast, when a 
company opts for a staggered board, directors are grouped into different 
 
 37. See Richard H. Koppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate over Classified 
Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1029 n.19 (1999) (providing a list of relevant state law 
provisions allowing staggered boards).  
 38. A unitary board structure is the default in all states, except for Massachusetts, Indiana, 
and Iowa, where the default is reversed. Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a 
staggered board default for public companies back in 1990. See Guhan Subramanian, 
The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate 
and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1859 (2002) (offering a historical 
account of Massachusetts’ decision to move to a staggered board default); see also MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)-(g) (2015). Indiana followed in 2009 and Iowa in 2011. IND. 
CODE § 23-1-33-6(c) (2015); IOWA CODE § 490.806A (2015). While Oklahoma had 
followed suit in 2010, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1027(D) (2012), it reversed course in 
March 2013 and changed the default back to the annual election of directors, see 2013 
Okla. Sess. Laws 2.  
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classes, with each class of directors standing for reelection in successive years. 
Typically, staggered boards have three classes of directors39—the maximum 
number of classes most states permit40—with directors in each class being 
elected to three-year terms. 
A company can provide for the adoption of a staggered board, subject to 
shareholder approval, in either its corporate charter or its bylaws.41 The 
location of the staggering provision is nontrivial because it determines how 
effective a staggered board is in protecting incumbent directors from rapid 
removal by the shareholders. Dismantling a staggered board established in the 
charter involves the coordinated action of the board and the shareholders, as 
charter amendments can be initiated only by the board and require shareholder 
approval.42 Conversely, shareholders can unilaterally dismiss a staggered board 
established in the bylaws, as board initiative is not required for bylaw 
amendments.43 In such a situation, shareholders determined to remove a 
majority of the board may be able to do so in a single vote at the next annual 
shareholder meeting.44 By contrast, with a staggering provision in the charter, 
shareholders will commonly need to wait two election cycles—each likely 
separated by at least a year—before they are able to replace a majority of the 
board.45 This dichotomy explains why only charter-based staggering 
provisions are generally accepted as “effective” insulation mechanisms.46  
Legislative histories attest that corporations have employed staggered 
boards for decades, at least since the time of some of the first state corporation 
 
 39. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893 (2002).  
 40. See Koppes et al., supra note 37, at 1029 & n.21 (providing a detailed summary of the 
number of staggered board classes allowed by state laws). 
 41. In Delaware, and most other states, shareholder approval is required to adopt a 
staggered board after the initial charter or bylaws are in place. JASON D. MONTGOMERY, 
INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., CLASSIFIED BOARDS 4 (1998); see, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2015). The notable exception is Maryland, where the board has 
unilateral power to adopt a staggered board. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-803 
(2015).  
 42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2010) (requiring shareholder approval for all but minor changes to the charter). 
 43. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(a)-(b). 
 44. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1392-93 (2001) (explaining that as long as provisions that interfere 
with the shareholders’ ability to take control of a board are not established in the 
charter, shareholders can “work around” them by amending the bylaws).  
 45. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 890.  
 46. See id. at 894 (specifying that a staggered board is “effective” if (i) it is installed in the 
charter, (ii) directors may be removed only for cause, and (iii) shareholders may not 
“pack the board” by increasing the number of board seats and filling the vacant seats).  
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laws, mostly to ensure continuity of leadership.47 The governance implications 
of having a staggered board, however, radically changed with the development 
of the hostile tender offer in the late 1960s.48 A staggered board could now 
function as an antitakeover defense by forcing a prospective acquirer to go 
through a costly waiting period before being able to appoint a new majority of 
directors.  
However, this defense had a limited deterrent effect.49 Staggered elections 
could not prevent a bidder from acquiring a large block of shares; they could 
only delay a bidder’s ability to exercise voting control50—which, in practice, 
frequently incentivized incumbents to resign before the expiration of the two-
year delay.51 
The invention of the “poison pill” defense in the 1980s52—combined with 
later developments in Delaware case law that sustained a board’s ability to use 
the pill53—removed this tactical weakness.54 Because the adoption of a pill 
significantly dilutes a bidder’s economic rights, it prevents hostile takeovers 
unless the bidder can have the pill redeemed by a majority of directors. With 
an effective staggered board in place, however, a bidder is required to wait 
through two annual elections before being able to do so—a requirement that 
 
 47. See Michael E. Murphy, Attacking the Classified Board of Directors: Shaky Foundations for 
Shareholder Zeal, 65 BUS. LAW. 441, 442 & n.9 (2010).  
 48. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 1518 (explaining that before the 1950s, tender offers were 
used only internally for stock-repurchasing purposes).  
 49. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 576 (1986) (recognizing that incumbent 
directors “would often find it in their interest to come to terms with” new 
shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural 
Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 781 (1982) (“[C]lassification 
alone will not prevent a majority shareholder from removing and replacing incumbent 
directors . . . .”).  
 50. Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 903-04. But see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 871, 913-14 (2002) (arguing that staggered boards functioned as antitakeover 
devices before the promulgation of poison pill provisions, and noting additionally that 
staggered boards could deter prospective bids or the completion of an acquisition). 
 51. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 49, at 793-94; see also CLARK, supra note 49, at 576. 
 52. A poison pill consists of stock purchase rights that are granted to existing shareholders 
in the event a corporate raider accumulates more than a certain threshold of 
outstanding stock, and that entitle the existing shareholders (but not the raider) to 
acquire newly issued stock at a substantial discount from the market price. See 
Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz: The Share Purchase Rights Plans, 
in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 3, 4-12 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (setting forth terms of a standard poison pill). 
Unlike staggered boards, poison pills do not require shareholder approval and can be 
adopted at any time. See id. 
 53. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.  
 54. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 326 (2000) (“[I]t was largely for this reason that the pill was 
invented.”). 
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substantially reduces her ability to redeem a pill through the ballot box. By 
delaying both the acquisition of a control block and the exercise of voting 
control by a prospective acquirer, the complementary use of a staggering 
provision and a poison pill vests the board with de facto veto power over 
hostile bids. 
Yet the takeover market did not come to an end after the development of 
this potent defense combination. Instead, takeover activity reached 
unprecedented levels during the late 1990s and early 2000s—boosted by 
favorable macroeconomic conditions and the increase in (oftentimes 
nominally) friendly acquisitions.55 However, the transformation of the 
staggered board into a strong antitakeover device did mark the beginning of a 
profound conceptual divide between those praising the virtues of strong 
boards protected from shareholder removal and those decrying their vices. As 
discussed below, this divide continues to this day and is arguably the most 
prominent manifestation of the persistent corporate governance debate over 
the optimal division of power between boards and shareholders. 
B. The Theoretical Divide  
1. Board and shareholder power 
The debate over the balance of power between shareholders and boards 
reflects competing understandings of the optimal allocation of authority 
within the corporation. In every organization, there are two types of authority: 
real and formal.56 Real authority comprises the right to initiate and implement 
actions that affect an organization.57 Formal authority, in contrast, comprises 
ultimate decisionmaking power—namely, the right to ratify or reverse 
decisions about actions affecting the organization.58 Under the separation of 
ownership and control that characterizes U.S. public corporations, real 
authority is undisputedly granted to managers, who run the business 
enterprise. Disagreement, however, arises as to the attribution of formal 
authority. Board advocates defend a model in which formal authority over the 
corporation is entrusted to the board.59 Shareholder advocates, on the other 
 
 55. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 50, at 879-81, 879 tbl.2, 880 tbl.3 (detailing trends in 
M&A activity from 1988 to 2000); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The 
Eclipse of the Shareholder Paradigm 17-20, 17 fig.1, 18 fig.2 (1Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors) (detailing trends in M&A activity and tender offers 
from 1981 to 2013).  
 56. See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. 
POL. ECON. 1, 1-2 (1997). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id.  
 59. Although board advocates come to this point from different perspectives, they all share 
the view that the board should retain ultimate decisionmaking power over the 
footnote continued on next page 
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards 
68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
80 
hand, defend a model in which formal authority is entrusted to the 
shareholders.60 Since the adoption of a staggering provision strengthens a 
board’s authority vis-à-vis shareholders, it is thus unsurprising that board 
advocates and shareholder advocates, as we explain below, hold diametrically 
opposed views of staggered boards.  
Under the corporate model defended by board advocates, the board retains 
control over corporate decisionmaking, while shareholders can reverse the 
actions of directors only under limited and enumerated circumstances, or by 
removing directors after a time frame that allows for adequate ex post 
evaluation of directorial actions. The board’s informational advantage provides 
the key economic argument for this allocation of corporate powers. In the 
modern corporation with dispersed ownership, collective action problems 
disincentivize shareholders from acquiring the information necessary to 
actively participate in corporate decisionmaking.61 Entrusting formal 
authority to the board addresses this concern. It also allows directors, who have 
better access to firm-specific information, to exercise ultimate decisionmaking 
power and mitigate managerial moral hazard by preventing managers from 
exploiting real authority over the corporation to promote their own interests 
 
corporation. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550, 559-74 (2003) (exposing a theory of the 
corporation that combines board primacy and share value maximization); Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
250-55 (1999) (developing a theory of the corporation that embraces “virtually absolute” 
board authority, while rejecting shareholder wealth maximization); Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 8, at 658-61 (defending the received board-centric model of the 
corporation). Members of the Delaware judiciary also feature prominently among 
board advocates. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 4, at 1657-61 (attributing national economic 
decline to, among other causes, the erosion of board primacy); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward 
a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving 
Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1777-82 (2006) (illustrating how a 
traditionalist would defend the “republican” board-centric model of the corporation 
against proposals to move to a “direct democracy” model). Martin Lipton, the noted 
corporate lawyer, has also long been a leading defendant of board power. See, e.g., 
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130-31 (1979) 
(defending board primacy in the takeover context).  
 60. Notably, the leading voice among shareholder advocates is Harvard Law School’s 
Lucian Bebchuk. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 198 (2004) (arguing that 
shareholders should play a greater role in setting executive compensation); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 
(2002) (challenging board primacy in the takeover context); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 851-75 (2005) [hereinafter 
Bebchuk, Shareholder Power] (advocating for the expansion of shareholder governance 
rights); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
694-711 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise] (advocating for a reform of 
corporate elections so as to make directors more accountable to shareholders).  
 61. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 569-72. 
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rather than those of shareholders.62 The board’s incentive to acquire private 
information—and to act on that information so as to maximize firm value—
would be lost if less-informed shareholders had the power to constantly 
disrupt board policy or displace directors in the short term.63 
Proponents of this view regard the institutional guarantee of the three-
year board term provided by staggered boards as helpful to protect the board’s 
informational advantage vis-à-vis imperfectly informed shareholders and 
capital markets. The increased protection afforded by the three-year term, 
board advocates argue, has several important implications. First, board 
staggering promotes beneficial organizational stability and institutional 
memory,64 a benefit that also informs the staggering provisions used in the U.S. 
Senate and other government bodies.65 Second, in takeover situations, 
staggering increases a target board’s bargaining power vis-à-vis prospective 
acquirers.66 Third, outside the takeover context, protecting directors from 
shareholder and market pressures is essential to mitigate short-termism. In the 
standard rendering, short-termism results from the risk that “impatient” 
shareholders with short-term liquidity needs and an innate tendency to heavily 
 
 62. See id. at 557-59 (suggesting that the board of directors incarnates economist Kenneth 
Arrow’s description of a “central agency to which all relevant information is 
transmitted and which is empowered to make decisions binding on the whole firm”); 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 664-65 (citing Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 309 (1983)). 
 63. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder 
Interventions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 231, 234-36 (1Jennifer G. 
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015); Strine, supra note 13, at 476 & n.80 (drawing a 
parallel between the need for a centralized, insulated authority in corporations and 
governments); Strine, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that frequent shareholder intervention 
would distract managers from profit-producing activities). 
 64. See, e.g., Koppes et al., supra note 37, at 1051-52. 
 65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378-80 (probably James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (describing the permanent and stable nature of the U.S. Senate as essential to its 
purposes). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (providing that the U.S. Senate be 
classified into three classes serving staggered six-year terms). 
 66. Under the “bargaining power hypothesis,” staggered boards would help directors both 
to extract higher acquisition premiums and to reject offers that their private 
information suggests are inadequate. Cf. Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1057-59 (2002) (describing how the use of the combined defense 
provided by a staggered board and a poison pill enabled Willamette to resist a takeover 
attempt by Weyerhaeuser and then bargain for a much higher takeover premium). See 
generally Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE 
L.J. 621 (2003) (reviewing the theory, empirics, and anecdotal evidence on the 
bargaining power hypothesis of antitakeover defenses). 
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discount future gains67 might prefer investments with lucrative short-term 
results at the expense of long-term firm value.68 
In stark contrast, under the governance model defended by shareholder 
advocates, shareholders retain the right to subject directors to specific controls 
on virtually any important aspect of corporate decisionmaking, as well as the 
right to promptly displace the board.69 Economically, the case for empowering 
shareholders draws on Jensen and Meckling’s classical agency framing of 
corporate relationships.70 Under this paradigm, shareholder advocates 
essentially assume away the role of the board of directors and cast the 
interactions among shareholders and managers as a bilateral agency 
relationship.71 They do so on the argument that top managers and “imperial 
CEOs”—who control the flow of information from lower corporate layers to 
the board and, more importantly, the board-appointment process—can capture 
directors.72 Thus, shareholder advocates argue, shareholders, rather than 
 
 67. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 35-36 (describing short-termism as              
a problem arising from short-term investors “who need to sell to meet liquidity      
needs . . . . while the stock is under-priced”).  
 68. It appears that the first commentator to raise short-termism concerns was Martin 
Lipton. See Lipton, supra note 59, at 104-05; see also William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin 
Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1383, 1383-84 (2005) (attributing to 
Lipton the view that traded securities are frequently mispriced). In more recent times, 
short-termism concerns have been raised by academics, organizational leaders, business 
columnists, corporate lawyers, and business organizations. See Bebchuk, supra note 13, 
at 1639-40, 1639 nn.2-6, 1640 nn.7-11 (collecting the most important contributions 
expressing short-termism concerns). 
 69. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 60, at 865-70 (advocating for a regime in 
which “shareholders would be able to initiate and adopt any rules-of-the-game 
decisions,” including changes to corporate charters and the state of incorporation); 
Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 60, at 696-98 (proposing a corporate electoral 
system in which shareholders would be able to directly place candidates on the ballot 
and be entitled to expense reimbursement).  
 70. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel are credited with having restated Jensen and 
Meckling’s theory in the context of corporate legal theory. See generally FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991). 
 71. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 60, at 842 (casting directors and 
managers collectively—as “management”—against shareholders). 
 72. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 60, at 8, 61-79, 80-82 (arguing that managers’ high 
compensation results from their capture of directors); 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS § 9.3 (Supp. 1999-1); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754, 842 
(2002). The empirical evidence, however, does not seem to be fully consistent with the 
“board capture view.” See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 987, 989 (2010) (finding a movement away from the “imperial CEO” model due to 
changes in the underlying economic and regularly landscape); Randall S. Thomas, 
Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. 
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potentially captured boards, should exercise formal authority over the 
corporation in order to decrease the risk that managers engage in moral 
hazard.73 
Underpinning the argument that enhanced shareholder power avoids 
board capture and reduces managerial moral hazard are two crucial 
assumptions, borrowed from financial economic theory. First, shareholders 
have socially optimal incentives to maximize firm value because of their 
position as residual firm claimants,74 unlike directors and managers, whose 
incentives may deviate according to their private interests in compensation 
and job retention. Second, under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH), market prices effectively aggregate information and thus accurately 
reflect expectations of the underlying fundamental values.75 These combined 
assumptions minimize the potency of the information asymmetry problem 
that rests at the core of the board-centric view. If market prices can serve as an 
informational focal point, and if shareholders have the best incentives to 
provide value-enhancing governance inputs, vesting shareholders with formal 
authority over the corporation naturally emerges as the optimal allocation of 
corporate powers. 
Under this alternative view of corporate relationships, the adoption of a 
staggered board is seen as nothing more than a way to entrench directors and 
managers and increase the risk of moral hazard.76 Furthermore, a staggered 
board would negate the disciplinary mechanism provided by the market for 
corporate control: by forcing a prospective bidder to endure a significant delay 
before acquiring corporate control, staggered boards enable insiders to block 
value-increasing acquisitions77 and preemptively deter bidders from making 
valuable offers.78 Once these costs are taken into account, they outweigh any 
 
REV. 1171, 1175-76 (2004) (arguing that “board capture theory” does not explain several 
observations about CEO compensation). 
 73. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 60, at 913-14 (suggesting that increasing 
shareholder power would “reduce agency costs”); Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra 
note 60, at 732 (arguing that empowering shareholders will “improve the 
accountability and performance of corporate boards”).  
 74. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the firm’s equity-holders are 
exclusive and strong, they will have powerful incentives to maximize the value of the 
firm.”). 
 75. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).  
 76. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 891. 
 77. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1180-81 (1981). 
 78. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 42-43 (1980) (discussing how shareholder 
freeriding—that is, shareholders refusing to tender their shares to a takeover entity 
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expected benefits a staggered board might otherwise promote, both within and 
outside the takeover context. In particular, while shareholder advocates 
acknowledge that empowered shareholders may occasionally raise short-
termism concerns, these concerns, they argue, should not be placed on equal 
footing with the much larger problem of managerial moral hazard, which 
remains a first-order governance problem.79 
2. The “end of history” for staggered boards? 
Despite the intensity of the corporate power debate, the longstanding legal 
model for U.S. corporations (as embedded, essentially, in Delaware corporate 
law) has been consistently board-centric. Indeed, aside from the exercise of veto 
rights over some fundamental corporate transactions,80 shareholders are 
unable to direct or oversee the management of the corporation—a power 
exclusively vested in the board of directors.81 As aptly remarked by Melvin 
Eisenberg in a highly influential article, “[u]nder the received legal model . . . no 
one acts as agent of the shareholders . . . . The officers are agents of the board. 
The board, in turn, is conceived to be an independent institution, not directly 
responsible to shareholders in the manner of an agent.”82  
Under this model, the only way for shareholders to influence corporate 
policy is to replace the incumbent board with new directors that are expected 
to implement the desired changes.83 Yet the combined adoption of a staggered 
board and a poison pill may make even this route impractical—unless a 
prospective acquirer can convince a court that the target’s directors breached 
their fiduciary duties by rejecting the bidder’s proposal,84 which is not an easy 
case to make.85 Since the seminal 1985 decision in Moran v. Household 
 
because they think the firm value will increase when the entity takes over—deters 
bidders).  
 79. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1651 (rejecting the view that depicts “the long-term 
costs of shareholder power and activism as large and the threats posed by them as 
grave”); cf. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism: In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 
68 BUS. LAW. 977, 1004 (2013) (arguing that short-termism “is insufficiently strong, 
empirically and theoretically, to affect corporate rulemaking”). 
 80. See generally Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 183 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the 
characteristics of what makes a transaction “fundamental”). 
 81. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2010).  
 82. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1969). 
 83. See CLARK, supra note 49, at 21-22. 
 84. See Koppes et al., supra note 37, at 1031-35. 
 85. See Lipton, supra note 59, at 101 (“[N]o director has ever been held liable for the 
rejection of a takeover bid . . . .”). 
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International, Inc.86—later sustained by Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time 
Inc.87—Delaware courts have tilted decidedly toward upholding the primacy of 
directorial power in deciding whether a takeover bid should move forward.88 
That power gives directors the right to maintain a poison pill indefinitely, 
essentially providing them with the ability to “just say no” to unsolicited 
acquisition bids.89 
In the last decade, however, the balance of power has shifted rather 
dramatically as a result of both regulatory reforms and shifts in capital markets 
and corporate practices that promote shareholder empowerment. Regulatory 
changes have occurred at both the state and federal levels, including, among 
others, amendments to proxy filing requirements that facilitate the use of 
shareholder proposals,90 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation 
Law that grant shareholders greater access to the ballot box,91 and most 
recently, the introduction of say-on-pay shareholder votes92 and a further 
expansion of the scope of shareholder proposals to effect changes in corporate 
election procedures.93 These regulatory reforms were accompanied by changes 
 
 86. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Moran upheld the adoption of the poison pill. Id. at 1357. 
Under Moran, Delaware directors have been subjected to the heightened form of 
judicial review established in Unocal, under which they need to prove the 
reasonableness and good faith of their actions. Id. at 1356; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). In several other jurisdictions, however, 
directors rejecting a takeover bid are subject to the more lenient business judgment 
rule. See Lipton, supra note 66, at 1049 & n.49. 
 87. 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-55 (Del. 1990). 
 88. See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the 
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2002). 
 89. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 905-06 (explaining that while under Moran the right 
to reject a bid was subject to constraints, it became virtually unconstrained after 
Paramount); see also Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152-55 (upholding management’s use of a 
poison pill to reject a hostile offer because it was inconsistent with long-term business 
strategy). 
 90. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 72, at 1013-15, 1017-22 (providing a thorough discussion 
of the changes that have occurred in proxy rules in the past ten to twenty years). 
 91. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2015) (providing that a company’s bylaws may give 
shareholders the right to nominate dissident slates of directors); id. § 113(a) (allowing 
shareholders to adopt bylaws that reimburse “expenses incurred by a stockholder in 
soliciting proxies in connection with an election of directors”). 
 92. All publicly traded companies are now required by the legislation introduced by the 
Dodd-Frank Act to submit executive compensation arrangements for the nonbinding 
approval of the general shareholders at least once every three years. See Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2014). 
Section 78n-1 also requires a separate vote every six years that allows shareholders to 
impose a say-on-pay vote more frequently (i.e., annually or biannually). See id. § 78n-
1(a)(2). The SEC, however, has authority to exempt companies from say-on-pay 
requirements after taking into account, among other considerations, whether these 
requirements would disproportionately burden smaller companies. See id. § 78n-1(e). 
 93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78n note (2014); see also 
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in shareholder concentration and activism, including an increase in 
institutional shareholdings,94 the rise of activist hedge funds and private equity 
funds,95 the emergence of proxy advisory firms,96 new “universal” majority 
voting and accompanying withhold campaigns,97 and the growing use and 
success of shareholder proposals98—especially proposals to remove staggered 
boards.99 
 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,687, 56,782 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (promulgating regulations 
pursuant to the statute). 
 94. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 
(2013) (“In 2011, for example, institutional investors owned over 70% of the 
outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.”). The phenomenon 
of ownership reconcentration has steadily grown since the 1990s, when scholars first 
began to take note of it. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 520, 570 (1990) (documenting that the percentage of institutional 
ownership in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies had increased from 45.2% 
in 1980 to 54.4% in 1988). Today’s institutional investors, however, seem much more 
willing to take an active governance stance than they have been in the past, especially 
in cooperation with hedge funds. See Gilson & Gordon, supra, at 867; Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 72, at 1003-04. 
 95. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 17-21 (suggesting that the rise of hedge 
fund activism has shown that “the shareholder collective action problem is not as 
preclusive as everybody assumed”). 
 96. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 72, at 1005-06.  
 97. See id. at 1010. In order to be elected to the board under a majority voting system, a 
director is required to win the votes of a majority of the shares voting. By contrast, in a 
plurality voting system, the director with the most votes—and thus, potentially, even a 
single vote—wins. See id. at 1010-11. Majority voting has emerged as the most potent 
weapon in the new arsenal of shareholders’ governance levers, with activist 
shareholders increasingly threatening to engage in withhold campaigns against 
incumbents so as to obtain desired governance changes—especially the removal of 
antitakeover defenses. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common 
Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System 
of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 11-12 (2007). Withhold (or “just say no”) 
campaigns involve the withholding of votes on specific governance issues, such as the 
election of directors. Before the adoption of majority voting, withhold campaigns 
could at best cause embarrassment to director nominees. Under majority voting, they 
have become potent weapons to defeat incumbent directors. 
 98. Under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2014), a 
public company is required to include a shareholder proposal (and related supporting 
statements) in its proxy statement and allow shareholders to vote on the proposal 
unless either the shareholders have not complied with eligibility or procedural 
requirements or some other named exception applies. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015). 
 99. Tellingly, major institutional investors, including American Funds, Blackrock, 
CalPERS, Fidelity, TIAA-CREF, and Vanguard, as well as major proxy advisory firms 
such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) and Glass Lewis, all have current 
policies that actively promote the annual election of directors. See Alma Cohen & 
Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value?: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 628 (2013). 
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These changes have reignited the debate around board insulation, with the 
battle over staggered boards repeatedly making national headlines.100 Both 
short-term and long-term issues have taken center stage in the insulation 
debate’s new momentum, largely due to increased shareholder activism. For 
board advocates, this development makes the current case for shielding boards 
from shareholder and market pressures more compelling than ever. In the past 
decade, however, shareholder advocates have armed themselves with empirical 
evidence that allegedly supports the view that the adoption of a staggered 
board is detrimental to shareholder interests.101 In their view, this is the “end of 
history” for staggered boards.  
As recently remarked by Lucian Bebchuk—the best-known proponent of 
shareholder empowerment and an outspoken critic of staggered boards—
“[w]hile insulation advocates have used strong rhetoric in expressing their 
concerns, . . . [their] claims rely on critical and unsubstantiated premises, 
overlook significant long-term costs of board insulation, and are not backed by 
empirical evidence.”102 Under Bebchuk’s theory, no further discussion of the 
merits of staggered boards is necessary because “the market itself has provided 
a negative answer regarding its worth.”103 Even a defender of the traditional 
board-centric model of the corporation, Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., has recently conceded that the successful efforts of Bebchuk 
and other shareholder advocates have turned staggered boards into an 
“endangered-species,”104 predicting that “[w]ithin the next few years . . . 
classified boards will be rarer than novel turns of phrase by political 
pundits.”105 
Bebchuk’s argument that “statistics provided by academic research provide 
objective evidence that is valuable for policymaking”106 is a cogent one. 
However, this Article challenges Bebchuk’s contention—as well as similar 
contentions made by other shareholder advocates—that the available empirical 
evidence indicates that “public officials and institutional investors would do 
well to reject arguments that are based on the asserted long-term benefits of 
 
 100. See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Wachtell Defends Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 21, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://nyti.ms/1LdelCY; Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 
PM), http://nyti.ms/19FGtNk; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Staggered Boards and 
Company Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://nyti.ms 
/1wPSVmK; Andrew Ross Sorkin, An Unusual Boardroom Battle, in Academia, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (1Jan. 5, 2015, 9:42 PM), http://nyti.ms/1yuj7Wg.  
 101. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 102. Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1642.  
 103. Murphy, supra note 47, at 446. 
 104. Strine, supra note 13, at 497. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1667. 
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board insulation.”107 This Article aims to disprove this assertion by setting out 
new empirical evidence on the value impact of staggered boards as well as a 
revisited theoretical framework for examining the merits of empowered 
boards—broadly speaking, boards that retain their historical authority to keep 
shareholder and market pressures at some distance. Before moving to that 
discussion, however, Subpart C briefly reviews the existing body of empirical 
studies on staggered boards, addresses the limitations of those studies, and 
discusses the impact that they have had on current corporate practices.  
C. Empirical Evidence and Corporate Practices 
By documenting an association between staggered boards and lower firm 
value, existing empirical studies have strongly advanced the view that 
staggered boards promote managerial moral hazard.108 As explained below, 
however, these studies are intrinsically limited in their ability to address 
endogeneity concerns—that is, the ever-present risk that correlation might be 
mistaken for causation. 
1. Existing empirical studies: methodologies and limitations  
Studies investigating the wealth effects of staggered boards explore the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value as measured by 
either aggregated governance indices or particular governance provisions. By 
design, the former category of studies—those which employ aggregated 
indices—estimate the strength of shareholder rights by focusing on 
“entrenchment” provisions that reduce the degree to which management is 
vulnerable to removal by shareholders, including staggered board provisions. 
Operating under the assumption that any and all protection from removal is 
detrimental to shareholder value, these studies posit that the larger the number 
of such “entrenchment” provisions, the weaker the shareholder rights. 
The “G-Index,” developed by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew 
Metrick,109 and the “E-Index,” developed by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and 
 
 107. See id. at 1644, 1687. 
 108. The view that staggered boards are detrimental to firm value has long been dominant 
in the empirical scholarship with basically one exception—a study by Thomas Bates, 
David Becher, and Michael Lemmon. See Thomas W. Bates et al., Board Classification 
and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. 
ECON. 656, 658, 675-76 (2008). Recently, more studies have emerged challenging that 
view, including our own finance study. See Cremers, Litov & Sepe supra note 16. For a 
description of these studies, see Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did 
Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law?: The Campaign Against Classified Boards of 
Directors 33-41 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 199, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536586. 
 109. See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 115 
(2003).  
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Allen Ferrell,110 are probably the most influential among governance indices. 
Using the G-Index, Gompers et al. found that firms with less shareholder 
protection (i.e., higher index scores) were less valuable in the period 1990-
1999.111 They also found that staggered boards were positively correlated with 
other provisions that weakened shareholder rights and reduced firm value.112 
Along the same lines, using the E-Index, Bebchuk et al. found that the negative 
correlation between entrenchment and firm value documented by Gompers et 
al. was fully driven by six of the G-Index’s twenty-four provisions, including 
staggered boards.113 Studies focusing on governance indices, however, may 
present methodological problems, as some governance provisions may matter 
more than others, some may have an impact only in specific circumstances, and 
others may have no impact at all.114 For this reason the E-Index, which only 
includes six provisions, is generally regarded as a better-motivated index than 
the G-Index.115  
An alternative way to investigate the wealth effects of staggered boards is 
to look within governance indices and focus specifically on the association of 
staggered boards and firm value through the use of either event studies or 
cross-sectional studies.116 Event studies examine stock price reactions to events 
that are assumed to capture the wealth effects of staggered boards, such as 
staggering and destaggering announcements or acquisition announcements in 
firms with and without staggered boards. The 2002 study published by Lucian 
Bebchuk, John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian in the Stanford Law Review is 
among the earlier event studies on staggered boards and documented that 
staggered boards have a significant negative effect on shareholder returns after 
a hostile bid is made.117 Subsequent event studies have reported results 
 
 110. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 
784-85 (2009). 
 111. See Gompers et al., supra note 109, at 109-10.  
 112. See id. at 117. 
 113. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 110, at 785, 789-91. 
 114. See id. at 785 (“We find no evidence that the eighteen [G-Index] provisions not in the E 
index are negatively correlated . . . with Tobin’s Q.”); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction 
in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1363 (2013) (recognizing that 
governance indices “contain unnecessary noise” and tempt “correlation with no 
potential causation”). 
 115. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1803, 1821-23 (2008) (describing industry adoption of the E-Index). But see 
Cremers, Masconale & Sepe supra note 26 (manuscript at 4-5) (producing evidence that 
challenges the results obtained using the E-Index by Bechuck et al.). 
 116. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 891. More specifically, in examining ninety-two 
hostile bids made against U.S. targets between 1996 and 2000, Bebchuk, Coates, and 
Subramanian found that having a staggered board reduces shareholder return after a 
bid by 8% to 10% on average. Id. at 890-91. 
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consistent with this evidence.118 A general problem with all of these studies, 
however, is that they present inherent endogeneity concerns. In particular, 
they cannot exclude the existence of a specification problem—arising when 
changes in the dependent variable are due to changes in some omitted variable 
rather than the independent variable119—as they bundle the market’s 
assessment of staggered boards with the market’s inferences of other firm news 
that might explain both the adoption of a staggered board and the observed 
reduction in firm value.120 
A different approach to evaluating the wealth effects of staggered boards is 
studying their cross-sectional association with firm value, as typically 
measured by Tobin’s Q—the ratio of the market value of assets to the book 
value of assets.121 The 2005 study by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen is 
arguably the best known among the studies adopting this methodology. 
Analyzing the eight-year span from 1995 to 2002, and controlling for other 
firm characteristics, Bebchuk and Cohen found that having a staggered board is 
associated, on average, with a statistically significant, and economically 
meaningful, lower firm value.122  
However, cross-sectional studies are also subject to endogeneity concerns. 
In particular, since governance arrangements are chosen in response to firm-
specific circumstances, cross-sectional studies of staggered boards could be 
affected by a simultaneity (or “reverse causality”) problem—with staggering 
 
 118. See Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 J. 
FIN. ECON. 501, 514-15 (2007) (reporting negative abnormal returns around staggering 
announcements in the period 1986-2002, although both the size and statistical 
significance of these results depend on the event window); Re-Jin Guo et al., Undoing 
the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274, 283-85 (2008) 
(documenting positive abnormal returns around announcements to destagger, 
although their results are insignificant on average); Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate 
Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1853, 1867-69 (2007) (documenting that 
acquisition announcements made by firms with a staggered board generate lower 
abnormal bidder returns).  
 119. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 120. See Cohen & Wang, supra note 99, at 629. Additionally, event studies of staggered 
boards have sometimes obtained results that are economically and statistically fairly 
weak. See supra note 118. Others studies, instead, have considered events that are quite 
selective—for example, focusing only on ex post successful acquisitions (as in Masulis 
et al.) or omitting bid outcomes for a substantially larger set of friendly bids (as in 
Bebchuk et al.). See sources cited supra notes 117-18. 
 121. See supra note 17.  
 122. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 17, at 410, 423-25. In a subsequent study, Olubunmi 
Faleye similarly found that the set of firms with a staggered board have a lower average 
firm value than the set of firms that do not. See Faleye, supra note 118, at 507-09. Using 
a variety of techniques, including cross-sectional analysis, Michael Frakes confirmed 
that staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value. See Michael D. Frakes, 
Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113, 150-51 (2007). 
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decisions being partly motivated by, rather than the cause of, low firm value.123 
The way to mitigate such endogeneity concerns is to consider how changes in 
firm characteristics are associated with changes in firm value. A time-series 
analysis that employs firm fixed effects is a standard methodology that allows 
such consideration. By including firm fixed effects, a time-series analysis 
controls for firm-level variables that are time invariant—in other words, that 
do not change over time—in a panel dataset. Thus, this methodology essentially 
allows researchers to examine how firm value changes over time within the 
same firm, rather than across firms, in comparison to changes in that firm’s 
governance provisions.124 But time-series analysis requires significant time 
variation. Accordingly, the focus of existing studies on a cross-sectional 
association seems largely attributable to limitations in available data over 
considerable lengths of time and the low number of changes in board 
structures, which constrained their ability to perform firm fixed effects 
regressions.125 
2. Practical effects and the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project  
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed above, the impact of existing 
empirical studies of staggered boards on corporate practices and investor 
behaviors cannot be overstated—especially in light of the widespread 
 
 123. All cross-sectional studies on staggered boards explicitly acknowledge this difficulty. 
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 17, at 410; Faleye, supra note 118, at 509; Frakes, 
supra note 122, at 116-17. 
 124. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.  
 125. Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang have recently examined the wealth effect of 
staggered boards by focusing on two Delaware court rulings from 2010 that had 
opposite effects on the ability of staggered boards to prevent the rapid removal of 
directors. See Cohen & Wang, supra note 99, at 628-29. In the context of Air Products’ 
epic quest to win over takeover target Airgas, the Delaware Chancery Court initially 
upheld a shareholder-initiated bylaw amendment that accelerated the date of Airgas’s 
next annual shareholder meeting—substantially shortening the delay caused by 
waiting two annual meetings forced on Air Products by Airgas’s staggered board. See 
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 8, 2010). Only one month later, however, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed 
the Chancery decision and held that measures designed to shorten the terms of service 
of staggered directors were impermissible. See Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 
A.3d 1182, 1194-95 (Del. 2010). Measuring announcement returns after each court 
ruling, Cohen and Wang found that the first ruling positively affected firm value, 
whereas the second ruling decreased firm value. See Cohen & Wang, supra note 99, at 
628, 633-35. Since court rulings are not endogenous to firm circumstances, nor can they 
be fully anticipated by market participants, examining the wealth effect of staggered 
boards through the quasi-experimental design used by Cohen and Wang should better 
address endogeneity concerns. However, in replicating their analysis, we find that their 
results are not robust in two respects: first, they seem sensitive to the removal of a 
single outlier; second, and more importantly, they do not survive in our replications 
when no or different industry fixed effects are included. The results of our replication 
of Cohen and Wang are available on request. 
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conviction that the debate cannot be fully resolved theoretically because both 
sides are potentially meritorious.126 Indeed, these empirical studies have played 
a critical—perhaps causal—role in promoting the recent trend toward board 
destaggering.127 
That role became even more pronounced with the 2010 creation of 
Harvard Law School’s Shareholder Rights Project (SRP).128 For three academic 
years, from 2011-2012 to 2013-2014, the SRP operated a clinical program to 
help institutional investors129 declassify their boards of directors through the 
drafting and submission of precatory proposals.130 In defending board 
declassification, the SRP proposals used a common format that relied 
substantially on the empirical studies reviewed above.131 In its three years of 
existence, the clinic’s work resulted in the declassification of boards at “about 
100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies.”132  
In a recent paper, Stanford Law School’s Joseph Grundfest and SEC 
Commissioner David Gallagher argued that the standard SRP proposal violates 
antifraud provisions of securities law because its exclusion of recent studies 
that support staggered boards133 constitutes a material omission.134 Defenders 
of the SRP, on the other hand, have observed that the standard SRP proposal 
does not purport to offer a full description of the relevant literature, but rather 
 
 126. See, e.g., Cohen & Wang, supra note 99, at 628; Faleye, supra note 118, at 502; Frakes, 
supra note 122, at 113; Klausner, supra note 114, at 1354. 
 127. See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2014) (suggesting that 
increased destaggering “has been led by shareholder activists and bolstered by academic 
research showing that staggered elections, on average, increase board entrenchment 
and reduce overall shareholder value”). 
 128. See SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). 
 129. The SRP represented eight institutional investors holding assets of over $400 billion 
and serving over three million members. See Investors Working with the SRP Clinic, 
SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu/clients.shtml (last visited     
Jan. 1, 2016). 
 130. Under Rule 14a-8, shareholders can use precatory proposals to request the board of 
directors to take a certain action—including destaggering the board—without 
mandating the action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015); see also Gallagher & Grundfest, 
supra note 108, at 13-14 (summarizing the requirements for the submission of precatory 
proposals by shareholders). 
 131. See Gallagher & Grundfest, supra note 108, at 22-23 (reproducing the SRP’s standard 
proposal in its entirety). 
 132. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, supra note 128. 
 133. See Gallagher & Grundfest, supra note 108, at 6.  
 134. See id. at 5-6. The test for materiality under federal security law is that of an omission 
presenting “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the 
omitted information] important in deciding how to vote.” See TSC Indus. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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simply states that the precatory proposal’s support for destaggering “is 
consistent” with the cited studies.135  
We take no position in this debate, and have included it only to highlight 
two elements of the vigorous policy discussion surrounding the governance 
role of staggered boards that have so far received little attention. First, in 
establishing a direct connection between the growing shareholder support for 
destaggering initiatives and the literature documenting a value-decreasing 
effect of staggered boards, the standard SRP proposal implicitly adds to the 
robustness of those studies. If staggered boards were beneficial, rather than 
detrimental, to firm value—so the argument goes—the statistics should show 
more staggering up and less staggering down. This approach, however, 
minimizes the influence that the cited studies have had in shaping investor 
beliefs about staggered boards. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
standard SRP proposal does not mention the inherent methodological 
limitations of the cited studies, notwithstanding the standard endogeneity 
disclaimers that appear in all of them.136  
In commenting on the recent SRP debate from the pages of the New York 
Times, Andrew Ross Sorkin has observed that “[a]lmost lost as collateral 
damage is the central question of whether staggered boards benefit or hurt 
shareholders. It should continue to be pursued as the smoke clears.”137 This 
Article adheres to that goal. Acknowledging the methodological limitations of 
prior empirical studies on staggered boards is a first and necessary step in that 
direction. The subsequent step is to take up the challenge of providing new 
time-series evidence on staggered boards. Part II turns to that task.  
II. New Empirical Evidence 
This Part empirically revisits the association between staggered boards and 
firm value by employing a panel dataset that covers thirty-four years of 
staggering and destaggering decisions (from 1978 through 2011). The use of this 
comprehensive dataset distinguishes our contribution from prior empirical 
studies, allowing us to consider both the cross-sectional and time-series 
evidence of the association between staggered boards and firm value. In 
particular, unlike prior studies, our study examines both the pre-1990 
evidence, in which many firms staggered up, and the increased destaggering 
that occurred in recent years. The inclusion in the dataset of these episodes of 
both significant staggering up and staggering down allows us to examine 
 
 135. See Jonathan R. Macey, SEC Commissioner, Law Professor Wrongfully Accuse SRP of 
Securities Fraud, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 15,             
2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/12/15/sec-commissioner-law-professor-
wrongfully-accuse-srp-of-securities-fraud. 
 136. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 137. See Sorkin, supra note 100.  
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average firm value before and after a change in board structure within the 
same firm and investigate comparisons of long-term value associations that are 
unique to the literature. This Article’s contribution should thus be regarded as a 
significant improvement to the identification strategiesmethods used to 
evaluate causal relationships in econometricsof prior staggered board 
studies. 
A. Data Description 
The overall data sample for our study covers the time period from 1978 to 
2011 and includes data from 3023 large publicly traded U.S. firms. Variables are 
briefly explained in Appendix Table A and descriptive statistics are given in 
Appendix Table B.  
Data come from several sources. Data for Staggered Board, an indicator 
variable for the presence of a staggered board and the study’s key independent 
variable, were obtained from two main sources. For the time period 1990-2011, 
as in prior studies that examined the wealth effects of staggered boards during 
the same period, we use the corporate governance dataset maintained by Risk 
Metrics, which acquired the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).138 For the time period from 1978 to 1989, we use a dataset constructed 
by one of us for an earlier coauthored study that provides information on the 
same provisions tracked by the IRRC from 1990 to 2011, including staggered 
boards.139 Data were also collected on whether staggered board provisions 
appeared in the firm charter or bylaws.140 
Since our main focus is on the value relevance of staggered boards, the 
main dependent variable in the analysis is firm value. Consistent with many 
prior studies investigating the relation between governance arrangements and 
firm value, we measured firm value using Tobin’s Q (Q),141 retrieving data 
from Compustat.  
 
 138. The IRRC did not publish its governance volumes in each year of the 1995-2002 sample 
period employed by several prior studies. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 17, at 
418. Thus, these studies effectively have available data for only the four years in which 
the IRRC published its volume, i.e., 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002. See id. For the missing 
years, these studies instead filled in the data by assuming that the governance 
provisions reported in published years held for the preceding year(s) when no IRRC 
volume was published. See id. In contrast, this Article employs hand-checked data on 
staggered boards in all missing years using proxy statements from the SEC’s EDGAR 
website. See generally EDGAR Search Tools, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www 
.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). 
 139. See Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 
69 J. FIN. 1167, 1171-74 (2014). 
 140. Bylaws-based staggered boards are rare, representing only 6.8% of firm-year 
observations—or 13.7% of staggered board occurrences—in the sample on average. See 
also Coates, supra note 44, at 1392-93 (describing how most states prohibit firms from 
providing for staggered boards in their bylaws). 
 141. See supra note 17. 
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To control for factors other than the adoption of a staggered board that 
could have an impact on firm value, we always include in our regressions the 
following standard controls, using Compustat data: the log of the book value of 
total assets (Assets), the return on assets calculated as the ratio of the firm’s 
EBITDA142 over the book value of total assets (ROA), the ratio of capital 
expenditures over the book value of total assets (CAPX), and the ratio of 
research and development expenditures over sales (R&D). Finally, in order to 
exclude the possibility that our results could be biased by an anticipation effect 
of future takeover activity,143 we also control for the firm’s industry takeover 
activity. As a proxy for this control, we employ the ratio composed of the 
mergers and acquisitions’ dollar volume in the Thomson Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database as against the total market capitalization, separately 
for firms in forty-eight industry groups, from CRSP for the previous calendar 
year (Industry M&A Volume).  
B. Staggering and Destaggering Decisions 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of firms with a staggered board in the 
sample each year from 1978 to 2011. The results indicate substantial time 
variation. In particular, the years from 1978 to 1983 illustrate a slow trend of 
staggering up, which rapidly accelerates from 1984 until 1992. A fairly stable 
ratio (hovering around sixty percent) of firms have staggered boards in the 
period from 1992 to 2006. After 2006, the ratio of firms with a staggered board 
steadily declines, until reaching about forty-seven percent in 2011. 
 
 
 142. EBITDA is earnings before tax, interest, depreciation, and amortization.  
 143. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.  
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Figure 1 
Percentage of Firms with a Staggered Board* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Figure 1 plots the percentage of firms in the sample that had a staggered board at the 
end of their fiscal year. 
 
The patterns shown in Figure 1 indicate a decline in the use of staggered 
boards, although this decline appears less dramatic in our data than suggested 
by other recent studies.144 Almost half of the firms in our sample had a 
staggered board in 2011—which should give shareholder advocates some pause 
before concluding that “corporate America has largely given up staggered 
elections for the board of directors.”145 Although in decline, staggered boards 
remain a salient feature of the U.S. corporate landscape. The debate on 
staggered boards thus seems unlikely to become marginal any time soon.146  
 
 144. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 72, at 1009 (documenting that the use of staggered 
boards has declined from 44% to 16% between 2003 and 2009 among S&P 100 firms). 
This difference is likely attributable to the difference in the sample of firms between 
this study and the study of Kahan and Rock. They examined a much lower number of 
firms and focus on the S&P 100, i.e., the 100 largest U.S. companies. See id. at 1008. On 
the contrary, our study primarily focuses on the S&P 1500. Consistent with Kahan and 
Rock, however, our results show that the highest incidence of destaggering has taken 
place among the largest firms in the sample.  
 145. Subramanian, supra note 127, at 2. 
 146. See Gallagher & Grundfest, supra note 108, at 4. 
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Figure 1, however, only documents how the incidence of staggered boards 
has evolved over time—it does not provide information on staggering and 
destaggering decisions. This information is important because shareholder 
advocates argue that the staggered boards we observe today are just relics of the 
past, with most firms having adopted a staggered board before the allegedly 
detrimental effects of this governance feature became public knowledge. More 
precisely, these advocates assume that shareholders virtually stopped ratifying 
staggered boards after 1990,147 when the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in 
Paramount v. Time, which upheld the board’s right to “just say no,” became fully 
known to investors.148 On this assumption, they conclude that “in the vast 
majority of companies that have staggered boards” after 1990, the presence of a 
staggered board “cannot be grounded in genuine shareholder consent,”149 
because had shareholders “been asked to ratify [the charter-based staggered 
board] of their companies after 1990, . . . they would have most likely refused to 
do so.”150 With this conclusion in mind, gathering information about 
staggering and destaggering decisions is important to better understand 
whether the current decline in staggered boards is attributable to shareholders’ 
discontinued consent to staggered boards or, rather, an increase in destaggering 
decisions.  
Figure 2 shows the cumulative number of changes in firms that have 
staggered up and staggered down over the past thirty-four years, only 
considering changes during years included in the sample.  
 
 
 
 147. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 17, at 410, 426 (claiming that since the 1990s, 
shareholders have been “reluctant” and “unwilling” to adopt staggered boards); Bebchuk 
et al., supra note 39, at 942 (suggesting that when staggered boards were adopted after 
Paramount v. Time it was because the shareholders either didn’t have a say or didn’t have 
a choice); Frakes, supra note 122, at 116-17 (suggesting that staggered boards have “a 
time-invariant nature”); cf. Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, 
and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757-59 (2003) (asserting 
that the decline in adoption of staggered boards “apparently reflects management 
realization that there is no point in even asking shareholders to support a classified 
board”). 
 148. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
 149. Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 944.  
 150. Id. at 943.  
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Figure 2 
Cumulative Changes in Board Structure* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Figure 2 plots the cumulative number of changes in board structure, separating the 
number of firms adopting a staggered board (“staggering up”) and the number of firms 
removing a staggered board (“staggering down”). 
 
Beginning with firm decisions to stagger up,151 one may observe that the 
number of staggering events has continued to grow, although at a decreasing 
rate. This continued growth contradicts the argument of shareholder advocates 
that shareholders have long stopped consenting to staggered boards. Indeed, 
from 1978 to 2011, a total of 324 firms in our sample adopted a staggered board. 
Admittedly, the largest annual increases in staggered boards were registered in 
the years from 1983 to 1986—before the definitive approval by the Delaware 
judiciary of a board’s right to “just say no.” In that four-year period, 172 firms 
(or about 53% of the total staggering events in our sample) moved to a 
staggered board structure. From 1990 to 2011, however, 89 firms (or 27.5% of 
the total staggering events in our sample) staggered up. These data indicate that 
shareholders have continued to approve staggered boards after 1990, although 
 
 151. This Article ignores changes occurring due to firms entering and exiting the sample. 
Firms enter and exit the sample due to their inclusion and exclusion in the relevant 
databases. Accordingly, these numbers have to be interpreted with caution, as the 
number of firms in the sample changes over time and had a significant one-time jump 
after 1989. For 1978-1989, the sample includes all publicly traded firms in the Fortune 
1000, on average about 850 a year, and after 1990, the sample includes basically all S&P 
1500 firms. 
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less frequently than in the pre-1990 era. Indeed, 65 out of the 89 firms that 
staggered up since 1990 did so before 2002, and only 24 firms have staggered up 
between 2002 and 2011. Thus, the real shift in shareholder sentiment seems to 
have taken place during the 2000s—a long time after the antitakeover 
significance of staggered boards became common knowledge. 
Firm decisions to dismantle their staggered boards show a similar, but 
reversed, pattern. Firms have been making destaggering decisions at an 
increasing rate, which helps explain decreasing staggered board levels over 
time. From 1978 to 2011, 259 firms in our sample removed a staggered board of 
directors, with 207 firms (or 80% of the total number of destaggering events in 
our sample) agreeing to destagger their board after 2001. Most staggered board 
removals took place after 2005, with 142 firms (or 55% of the total destaggering 
events in our sample) agreeing to destagger their board between 2006 and 2011. 
In contrast, only 7 sample firms removed a staggered board in the pre-1990 era, 
a period that exhibited a higher annual incidence of staggering-up decisions. 
During the 1990s, 41 firms agreed to destagger their board, while 46 firms 
staggered up.152 The data thus indicate that: (i) staggering-up activity 
dominated the period 1978-1989; (ii) the period 1990-2000 registered less 
staggering up and exhibited a balanced amount of staggering-up and 
staggering-down activity; and (iii) staggering-down activity dominated the 
period 2001-2011 (particularly after 2005). 
What determined the inversion in the tendency to stagger and destagger 
over the past decade, specifically after 2005? Recent studies have suggested that 
the corporate scandals of the early 2000s were “the proverbial ‘straw that broke 
the camels [sic] back.’”153 Following those scandals, the corporate landscape 
underwent a dramatic transformation, with newly empowered shareholders 
emerging as the most significant change of the post-Enron era.154 Thus, the 
argument goes, the increased dismantling of staggered boards is directly related 
to the rise of shareholder activism. In fact, as observed by one commentator, 
“the [increased] rate at which directors have agreed to destagger their boards—
after nearly two decades of refusing to do so” is “[t]he most telling measure” of 
the impact that shareholder activism has had on corporate governance 
 
 152. If one considers only the period 1995-2002, one observes 45 changes in staggering 
activity and 41 changes in destaggering activity, respectively accounting for 17% and 
16% of the overall time variation in board changes over the past three decades. This 
contradicts Bebchuk and Cohen’s conclusion that “there is little point in running a 
fixed firm effects regression that focuses on the variation over time within each given 
firm” given that, they argue, the 1995-2002 time period exhibits virtually no variation. 
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 17, at 425. In fact, as the next Subpart shows, running a 
time-series analysis with fixed firm effects for the 1995-2002 period produces 
surprising results, documenting the existence of a positive association between 
staggered boards and firm value.  
 153. Guo et al., supra note 118, at 275. 
 154. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
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practices in the last ten years.155 While these conclusions pertain to 
destaggering decisions, the same argument could reasonably be advanced to 
explain the lower rate of staggering up activity in the 2000s. 
C. Staggered Boards and Firm Value  
1. Cross-sectional and time-series analysis 
This Subpart, which constitutes the core of our empirical analysis, 
estimates the impact of staggered boards on firm value, controlling for fixed 
differences within firms (i.e., firm fixed effects), rather than just fixed 
differences across firms and years (i.e., industry and year fixed effects).  
For our analysis, we use a pooled panel of firms at the annual frequency, 
employing data at the fiscal year-end for each firm for both the dependent and 
independent (or control) variables. In general, pooled panels combine cross-
sectional information—of different firms at particular points in time—with 
time-series variation—of changes within particular firms over time. In what 
we call our cross-sectional analysis, we add industry fixed effects only. As 
board structure is generally stable over time, this means that the coefficient on 
board structure is dominated by differences across firms. In what we call our 
time-series analysis, we add firm fixed effects, i.e., a separate dummy for each 
different firm. This means that the coefficient on board structure is identified 
solely from changes to board structure, i.e., from events where firms adopt or 
remove a staggered board. Effectively, the time-series analysis estimates how 
firm value changes before versus after such changes in board structure. 
Table 1 below presents our results. As a starting point, Column (1) shows 
cross-sectional results for the period 1995-2002 using only year and industry 
fixed effects, substantially replicating the analysis of the 2005 study of Bebchuk 
and Cohen (who were the first to focus on that time period).156 In order to 
produce comparable results, we include their same controls.157 Column (2) 
shows the time-series results for this period, still including the same controls as 
in Bebchuk and Cohen, but this time replacing the industry fixed effects with 
firm fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4), respectively, present the cross-sectional 
and time-series results for the full sample period, 1978-2011. Due to limits in 
data availability, however, Columns (3) and (4) do not include all of the 
controls used in Columns (1) and (2).158 
 
 155. Klausner, supra note 114, at 1360. 
 156. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 17, at 410.  
 157. This extended set of controls includes G-Index, Ln (Assets), Insider Ownership, and Insider 
Ownership Squared (all defined in Appendix Table A). See id. at 420-21, 423 tbl.2.  
 158. While including the extended set of controls of the 2005 study of Bebchuk and Cohen 
significantly reduces the sample, the finance companion to this Article incorporates 
these controls, and the resulting analysis indicates that the conclusions remain robust. 
See Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 16, at 60 tbl.A.2. 
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Table 1 
Firm Value and Staggered Boards* 
Dependent Variable: Q 
 
Period: 
1995-2002 1978-2011 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Staggered Board -0.042 0.119* -0.041** 0.059** 
(firm cluster) (-1.17) (-1.82) (-2.38) (-2.11) 
[no cluster] [-1.83] [-2.15] [-4.98] [-4.65] 
G-Index 
-0.005 -0.005 
(-0.57) (-0.33) 
Assets 
0.052*** -0.396*** -0.027*** -0.215*** 
(3.24) (-8.10) (-3.74) (-12.01) 
Firm Age 
-0.050 0.327 
(-1.34) (1.59) 
Delaware Incorporation[t-1] 
-0.010 0.014 
(-0.28) (0.76) 
Insider Ownership 
0.318 0.562 
(0.95) (1.27) 
Insider Ownership2 
-0.179 -0.742 
(-0.37) (-1.06) 
ROA 
5.939*** 2.071*** 5.073*** 2.939*** 
(19.11) (7.74) (32.74) (20.27) 
CAPX 
-1.048** -0.907** -0.263 0.102 
(-2.17) (-2.19) (-1.14) (0.60) 
R&D 
5.499*** 0.423 4.231*** 1.445*** 
(7.17) (0.35) (12.01) (2.72) 
Industry M&A Volume[t-1] 
0.129 0.129 -0.235*** -0.248*** 
(0.85) (0.93) (-3.04) (-3.59) 
Fixed Effects: Industry Firm Industry Firm 
N 5253 5253 30,797 30,797 
R-Squared 0.63 0.84 0.51 0.74 
* This Table presents cross-sectional and time-series associations between firm value 
and the presence of a staggered board. Columns (1) and (2) use data for 1995-2002. 
Columns (3) and (4) use the full time period 1978-2011. All columns include the 
following independent variables: Staggered Board, Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and Industry 
M&A Volume. Columns (1) and (2) add these control variables: G-Index, Firm Age, Insider 
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Ownership, and Insider Ownership Squared. Columns (1) and (3) add the control variable 
Delaware Incorporation. The estimates use pooled-panel Tobin’s Q regressions.    
Columns (1) and (3) include year and industry fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) include 
year and firm fixed effects. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical 
significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, 
respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. For the key 
independent variable—Staggered Board—this Table shows two separate standard errors: 
“(.)” reflects robust standard errors clustered at the firm level; “[.]” reflects robust 
standard errors that are not clustered. 
 
Consistent with the findings of Bebchuk and Cohen, Column (1) 
documents that the cross-sectional association between Staggered Board and Q is 
negative and economically significant, suggesting that firms with a staggered 
board have firm values that are 2.4% lower than the average.159 The 
coefficient’s estimate, however, becomes statistically insignificant (a t-statistic 
of -1.17) when we use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level160—a 
standard technique in today’s empirical studies, but less frequent a decade ago. 
Using standard errors that are clustered by firm accounts for the tendency of 
governance provisions to be quite stable across time. Accordingly, using 
clustering is more reflective of the actual confidence we can have in reported 
estimates. Thus, the significant reduction in the cross-sectional coefficient on 
Staggered Board that we find upon using clustering should be interpreted as 
weakening our confidence in the documented negative impact of staggered 
boards on firm value in the cross section of firms.  
More significantly, replacing industry fixed effects with firm fixed 
effects—in practice, adding a dummy variable for each unique firm in the 
pooled panel—reverses the results of Column (1). Indeed, Column (2) shows a 
statistically significant positive association between Staggered Board and Q over 
the period 1995-2002. The economic magnitude of this positive association is 
also considerable, suggesting that the adoption of a staggered board is 
 
 159. The economic significance of the impact of Staggered Board on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of -0.042 by the sample average Q during 1995-2002 of 1.72.  
As standard in the finance literature, this Article calculates the economic significance 
of the regression coefficients considering the change in the dependent variable (firm 
value as proxied by Q1) that is associated with a change in the independent variable, 
normalized by the mean of the dependent variable. For independent variables that are 
dummy variables (like Staggered Board), the change in the independent variable is 
always equal to one. For continuous variables, the change in the independent variable is 
equal to the variable’s standard deviation. The economic significance of continuous 
variables is obtained by multiplying the standard deviation of the independent variable 
with that variable’s regression coefficient and then dividing this product by the mean 
of the dependent variable.  
 160. The coefficient estimate is, instead, statistically significant at the ten percent level        
(t-statistic of -1.17) based on using robust standard errors that are not clustered. 
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associated with an increase in firm value of 6.9%,161 which remains statistically 
significant even using robust standard errors clustered at firm level.162  
Columns (3) and (4) show similar results concerning the association 
between staggered boards and firm value for the full thirty-four-year period. 
Similar to Column (1), Column (3) shows that the cross-sectional association of 
Staggered Board and Q is negative and both statistically and economically 
significant. In particular, the findings suggest that firms with staggered boards 
have firm values that are 2.6% lower than the average.163 This result, however, 
is again reversed when industry fixed effects are replaced by firm fixed effects. 
As shown in Column (4), the association between Staggered Board and Q 
becomes positive, and both strongly statistically and economically significant. 
More specifically, the result for Column (4) suggests that staggered boards have 
an average overall impact on firm value—resulting from combining the 
changes in Q experienced by firms that stagger up and by firms that stagger 
down—that is positive and equal to 3.7%.164  
How might one reconcile the conflicting results from the cross-sectional 
and the time-series analyses? As we have documented elsewhere, one 
possibility is that the cross-sectional results are largely due to reverse causality: 
a relatively low firm value would induce firms to adopt a staggered board, 
rather than the other way around.165 This reverse causality could explain the 
cross-sectional result that firms with staggered boards tend to have lower firm 
values. However, reverse causality cannot explain the time-series results, 
 
 161. The economic significance of the time-series impact of Staggered Board on Q is obtained 
by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.119 by the sample average Q during 1995-
2002 of 1.72.  
 162. As in Column (1), the t-statistic of the Staggered Board coefficient decreases from 2.15 to 
1.82 when standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Reflecting the more limited 
time variation in staggered board changes during the period 1995-2002 (as compared to 
other periods in the sample), it is unsurprising that the statistical evidence of the 
estimated coefficient is reduced upon clustering standard errors. Unlike in the cross 
section, however, in the time series, the wealth effect of staggered boards is sufficiently 
strong such that the coefficient remains statistically significant at the ten percent level 
even when one uses clustering.  
 163. The economic significance of the impact of Staggered Board on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of -0.041 by the sample average Q during 1978-2011 of 1.58. As 
with the analysis of the 1995-2002 subperiod, the t-statistic of the Staggered Board 
coefficient increases from -4.98 to -2.38 when standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. 
 164. The economic significance of the impact of Staggered Board on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of 0.059 by the sample average Q during 1978-2011 of 1.58. As 
with the analysis of the 1995-2002 subperiod, the t-statistic of the Staggered Board 
coefficient decreases from 4.65 to 2.11 when standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level.  
 165. See Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 16, at 21-22, 51 tbl.7. Specifically, a standard 
deviation decrease in firm value can explain 35.1% to 57.8% of board staggering events 
in the sample, depending on which predicting model is employed. Id. at 22. 
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which document that firm value tends to go up after the adoption of a 
staggered board and down after the removal of a staggered board.  
These striking results raise difficult questions for critics of staggered 
boards who argue that staggered boards are detrimental to shareholders’ 
interests. If that assumption were true, one should find that the negative cross-
sectional association between staggered boards and firm value becomes 
statistically significantly stronger in firm fixed effects regressions.166 Instead, 
the results indicate that the sign of the coefficient is reversed in the time-series 
analysis, suggesting that the direction of causality runs from having a low firm 
value to adopting a staggered board.  
It could be argued, however, that the above analysis does not investigate 
the disentangled effects of staggering up and staggering down on firm value. As 
a result, the analysis cannot exclude the possibility that either staggering up or 
staggering down is really what is driving the overall results. Such possible 
entangling is not a trivial issue. If staggering up emerged as the primary driver 
of the empirical results, we could not prove that “bundling” and expected 
takeovers do not provide alternative explanations for the results. Bundling 
occurs when a firm’s management uses its agenda control to combine a charter 
amendment that the shareholders disfavor—for example, according to 
shareholder advocates, the adoption of a staggered board—with additional 
amendments enjoying shareholder support, such as the approval of a merger 
yielding shareholders a large payout.167 Under these circumstances, the 
advantages offered to the shareholders by the whole amendment package 
would explain the increase in firm value associated with the adoption of a 
staggered board.168 Bundling, however, cannot explain destaggering because 
shareholder advocates assume that destaggering is beneficial to shareholders 
and, therefore, should not require an additional sweetener to enjoy shareholder 
support.  
Related to the phenomenon of bundling is another possible explanation: an 
anticipation effect. Under this explanation, a staggering-up decision could 
reflect an increased probability that the firm would become a takeover target; 
the anticipation of takeover would be the true source of the observed increase 
in value (at least until the market price incorporated the fact that the board had 
staggered up, removing anticipation of a takeover and allowing the price to 
 
 166. If staggered boards caused firms to have a lower firm value, performing firm fixed 
effects regressions should add to the robustness of this result by eliminating potential 
bias in the estimated coefficient. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1549, 1552 (2010). 
 168. See id. at 1552-54 (producing evidence that they interpret as supporting the existence of 
a “bundling explanation” for the adoption of staggered boards).  
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resettle).169 However, the anticipation effect does not explain the decrease in 
firm value after the removal of a staggered board. Indeed, for shareholder 
advocates, destaggering should increase the ex ante probability of a takeover, 
and thus the anticipation effect should trigger an increase, rather than a 
decrease, in firm value. In order to address the possibility that these alternative 
explanations might be applied to the time-series evidence above, this Article 
next attempts to investigate the disentangled effects of staggering and 
destaggering decisions.  
2. Disentangled effects 
To disentangle the effects of staggering and destaggering decisions, we use 
two different dummy variables. The dummy Staggering Up equals one after the 
firm has adopted a staggered board (and only as long as the firm does not 
subsequently destagger). Note that in order to “adopt” a staggered board for the 
purposes of the dummy Staggering Up, the firm must have previously been 
present in the sample without a staggered board. As a result, in firm fixed 
effects regressions, Staggering Up captures the difference in valuation associated 
with the adoption of a staggered board. Similarly, Staggering Down equals one 
after the firm has removed a staggered board, such that this dummy captures 
the difference in firm value associated with the removal of a staggered board. 
Table 2 below shows our results. Columns (1) and (2), respectively, present 
results for Staggering Up and Staggering Down for the full sample, 1978-2011. 
After testing for the full period, subsample analyses were performed to 
establish the robustness of the results across different sample periods. 
Specifically, Columns (3) and (4) present results for Staggering Up and Staggering 
Down for the first half of the time period, 1978-1994, while Columns (5) and (6) 
present results for the second half, 1995-2011. For all columns in this Table, the 
t-statistics were provided based on robust standard errors that are clustered at 
firm level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 169. As takeovers usually produce high abnormal returns to the targets’ shareholders, the 
expectation of a future takeover may increase the target’s share price, as a result of an 
anticipation effect. See, e.g., Alex Edmans et al., The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The 
Impact of Prices on Takeovers, 67 J. FIN. 933, 934 (2012) (“[A]n anticipation effect may lead 
to reverse causality from takeover activity to market valuations, with forward-
looking prices inflated by the probability of a future takeover.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Table 2 
Firm Value and Staggering Up Versus Staggering Down* 
Dependent Variable: Q 
  
Independent 
Variables: 
Period: 
1978-2011 1978-1994 1995-2011 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Staggering Up 
0.0381 0.0232 0.130** 
 
(1.14) (0.76) (2.21)  
Staggering 
Down  
 -0.129*** -0.0598 -0.138*** 
 (-3.09) (-1.06) (-2.80) 
Assets  
-0.214*** -0.216*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.360*** -0.362*** 
(-11.95) (-12.03) (-4.18) (-4.17) (-15.13) (-15.13) 
ROA  
2.967*** 2.964*** 1.916*** 1.919*** 2.512*** 2.511*** 
(20.28) (20.39) (11.78) (11.77) (14.39) (14.39) 
CAPX  
0.115 0.115 0.139 0.137 0.27 0.26 
(0.67) (0.67) (0.78) (0.77) (1.09) (1.06) 
R&D  
1.465*** 1.445*** 2.659** 2.652** -0.137 -0.139 
(2.76) (2.74) (2.09) (2.07) (-0.24) (-0.24) 
Industry M&A 
Volume[t-1]  
-0.155*** -0.155*** -0.0789 -0.0791 -0.131** -0.128** 
(-2.86) (-2.86) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-2.15) (-2.12) 
Fixed 
Effects: 
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
N 30,797 30,797 11,384 11,384 19,413 19,413 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.739 0.74 0.783 0.783 0.764 0.764 
* This Table presents results separately associating changes in firm value with firm 
decisions to adopt a staggered board (Staggering Up) or to remove a staggered board 
(Staggering Down) in addition to a set of control variables. All columns include the 
following variables: Staggering Up, Staggering Down, Assets, ROA, CAPX, R&D, and 
Industry M&A Volume. The analysis includes the following subperiods: 1978-2011 in 
Columns (1)-(2), 1978-1994 in Columns (3)-(4), and 1995-2011 in Columns (5)-(6). The 
estimates use pooled-panel Tobin’s Q regressions. All specifications include year and 
firm fixed effects (not shown). Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical 
significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, 
respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
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As shown in Columns (1) and (2), which consider the full sample, the effect 
of board destaggering seems to dominate the effect of board staggering. Indeed, 
the coefficient estimate of Staggering Up (shown in Column (1)) is positive at 
3.8%, but statistically insignificant with a t-statistic of 1.14. Conversely, the 
coefficient of Staggering Down (shown in Column (2)) is negative at 12.9% and 
highly statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 3.09. The economic 
magnitude of the association between Staggering Down and Q is also 
considerable, suggesting that dismantling a staggered board is associated with a 
reduction in firm value of 8.2%.170  
Results for the subperiod 1978-1994, presented in Columns (3) and (4), 
similarly show that Staggering Up positively influences firm value while 
Staggering Down negatively influences firm value. However, the coefficient 
estimates for this subperiod are statistically insignificant for both Staggering Up 
and Staggering Down. Results for the subperiod 1995-2011, shown in      
Columns (5) and (6), confirm the positive and negative associations, 
respectively, of Staggering Up and Staggering Down with Q. In this case, 
however, both coefficients are statistically and economically significant—with 
Staggering Up being associated with a 7.5% increase in firm value171 and 
Staggering Down being associated with a 7.9% decrease in firm value.172 The 
subsample results thus suggest that the limited statistical evidence for the 
positive association between Staggering Up and firm value in the full sample 
might be attributable to the fact that most staggering up activity occurred 
during the 1980s,173 a period during which the data illustrate weaker 
associations between board structure and firm value. 
The results of Table 2 are thus incompatible with the conjecture that 
bundling or expected takeover activity might explain the overall time-series 
positive association between staggered boards and firm value, as these 
alternative hypotheses cannot explain the significant detrimental effects that 
destaggering decisions exert on firm value.  
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that staggered boards serve a 
positive, constructive role in corporate governance.174 However, a theory of 
board empowerment is needed to offer a complete account of both how 
 
 170. The economic significance of the impact of Staggering Down on Q is obtained by 
dividing the regression coefficient of -0.129 by the sample average Q during 1978-2011 
of 1.58.  
 171. The economic significance of the impact of Staggering Up on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of 0.130 by the sample average Q during 1995-2011 of 1.74. 
 172. The economic significance of the impact of Staggered Down on Q is obtained by dividing 
the regression coefficient of -0.138 by the sample average Q during 1995-2011 of 1.74.  
 173. See supra Figure 2. 
 174. Empirically, this conclusion is supported by further tests performed in the finance 
companion of this Article including, among others, first-difference regressions, 
portfolio analysis, and matching analysis. See Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 16, at 4. 
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staggered boards increase firm value, and why the competing push for 
empowered shareholders is not only empirically erroneous, but also 
theoretically lacking. We tackle this issue in Part III. 
III. Empowered Boards: Microeconomic Foundations  
This Part revisits the theoretical foundations of the board empowerment 
claim by drawing primarily from three different strands of economic 
literature: general equilibrium theory in the context of incomplete markets; 
asset pricing; and contract theory. Our analysis of these three theoretical 
strands makes clear that market imperfections are more complex and more 
important than typically acknowledged in the corporate law debate.175 Once 
these imperfections are taken into account, they not only strip away the 
alleged desirability of shareholder empowerment, but also expose the existence 
of a larger tradeoff in corporate governance than shareholder advocates 
generally realize.  
Indeed, while shareholder advocates admit that shareholder empowerment 
may result in increased short-termism, they quickly dismiss this tradeoff as 
being of little relevance because they consider short-termism to be a marginal 
risk relative to the risk of moral hazard.176 On the polar opposite side, board 
advocates seem largely unconcerned about directorial or managerial moral 
hazard,177 instead emphasizing that short-termism poses a first-order problem 
in corporate governance. So far, however, these commentators have drawn 
more from real-world experience than from theory for support,178 which 
helps explain the perception that their claims rest on a fragile theoretical basis 
within the larger academic debate.179 
 
 175. Michael Klausner engages in a paradigmatic revision of corporate law theory grounded 
on a similar premise, although he seems to appreciate the rise of shareholder power as a 
market-driven correction. See Klausner, supra note 114, at 1328-30. 
 176. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter 
Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 482 (2003). 
 178. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the 
Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-
wreck-the-economy (basing support for board insulation on “decades of . . . experience” 
accumulated while advising companies); Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s 
Shareholder Rights Project Is Wrong, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Mar. 23, 
2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvards-shareholder-rights-
project-is-wrong (criticizing the SRP’s destaggering activity on the ground of 
experience, suggesting that staggered boards are a beneficial governance arrangement). 
 179. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 13, at 1667 (arguing that “experience[]” is “not a good basis 
for policymaking”); cf. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 29 (“The shareholder 
opponents ask for too much when they call for present law reform to turn back 
empowered shareholders, for their claim of perverse short-term effects requires a more 
sustained interrogation than occurs in the debate’s confines.”). 
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The theoretical foundations we provide below serve to fill this void in the 
debate, pointing to the existence of a weightier tradeoff in governance 
structures.180 Our analysis reveals that concerns about managerial moral 
hazard are subordinate to the competing concerns posed by what we refer to as 
the shareholder limited-commitment problem. This problem is a consequence 
of market imperfections that render shareholders unable to credibly commit to 
the long-term horizon and, in turn, distort the incentives of both managers and 
other firm stakeholders to make optimal firm-specific investments. As 
explained below, an empowered board—which includes both staggered boards 
and, more broadly, boards that retain their historical authority to resist short-
term shareholder and market pressures—emerge as a desirable governance tool 
with which to address these distortions. It does so by serving as a value-
increasing device through which shareholders can credibly commit themselves 
to long-term engagements vis-à-vis managers and other firm stakeholders, in 
their own interest and that of society as a whole.  
A. General Equilibrium Theory in a Shareholder Economy  
General equilibrium analysis attempts to explain how prices coordinate 
the activities of an entire economy—including production, exchange, and 
consumption activities—in a way that leads to an efficient allocation of 
resources.181 In contrast, partial equilibrium analysis focuses on a single market 
or product, assuming that the prices of all other markets or products are 
fixed.182 While this simplifying assumption renders economic discussion more 
tractable, a general shortcoming of partial equilibrium analysis is that it may 
fail to accurately model real-world phenomena.  
This shortcoming exposes the limits of Jensen and Meckling’s agency 
theory in modeling shareholder behavior.183 By casting the interactions among 
market actors as a principal-agent relationship within the limited economic 
domain of a single firm, Jensen and Meckling reduce market imperfections to 
managerial moral hazard. This simplified setting assumes away shareholders’ 
future consumption preferences as well as feedback from other markets, and 
all market prices and value-relevant information are assumed to be general 
knowledge. Under these assumptions, no shareholder disagreement ever occurs 
over production choices, as all shareholders unanimously favor (expected) 
high-profit production plans over (expected) low-profit production plans.184 
 
 180. See infra Part III.C. 
 181. For a general discussion of general equilibrium theory, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 515, 545-46 (1995). 
 182. See id. at 312, 325. 
 183. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.  
 184. See, e.g., Oliver D. Hart, Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 
53, 53 (1977).  
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Sidestepping the shareholders’ collective action problems, the only residual 
issue is the question of how to best induce the board and managers not to 
deviate from the firm’s objective maximization function; empowered 
shareholders—in the jargon of economists, a shareholder economy—emerge as 
the naturally desirable solution. 
Considerable complications arise, however, when we relax the assumption 
that shareholders’ consumption preferences185 are uniform.186 The problem is 
not only the divergence of interests that arises between shareholders with 
short-term objectives (i.e., liquidity needs) and long-term goals; divergence in 
risk preferences matters greatly as well. For example, shareholders who prefer 
a steady flow of income could favor a lower-profit production plan as long as it 
reliably delivers a stable dividend stream. Under general equilibrium theory, an 
additional assumption is therefore necessary to ensure that the firm’s profit 
maximization will continue to be objectively defined: the existence of 
complete markets.187 Under this assumption, there is a complete set of 
contingent markets that allows the buying and selling of claims on any good at 
every future point of time and in all possible economic circumstances.188 This 
set allows shareholders to insure their consumption preferences against 
unwanted uncertainty by trading securities that are contingent on future states 
of the world.189 In this environment, the Fisher Separation Theorem illustrates 
that the production function (i.e., a firm’s choice of investments) becomes 
independent of shareholder preferences.190 Accordingly, a firm’s profit 
maximization function is once again objectively defined as the maximization 
of that firm’s net present value.191 Consequently, as in Jensen and Meckling’s 
 
 185. See Jacques H. Dreze, (Uncertainty and) the Firm in General Equilibrium Theory, 95 ECON. J. 
(SUPPLEMENT: CONF. PAPERS) 1, 1 (1985) (explaining that “the primitive data, which the 
economist treats as exogenous and does not seek to explain” in fact “[b]asically . . . 
correspond to the opportunities and motivations of all agents”). 
 186. See id. (“General equilibrium theory . . . defines clearly the boundary between economic 
analysis and the exogenous primitive data or assumptions from which it proceeds; that 
is, it defines a precise, self-contained ‘model.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
 187. See Hart, supra note 184, at 53 (explaining that the argument that shareholders 
unanimously favor high-profit plans “relies implicitly on the assumption that either 
the future is certain or that firms can insure themselves against uncertainty by making 
contracts for contingent futures commodities”). 
 188. See 1 MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS 2 (1996) 
(describing complete markets). 
 189. For example, “a firm contemplating a new investment could simultaneously protect 
itself against demand uncertainties by selling its output at each date on a futures 
market, and against supply uncertainties by purchasing insurance against output 
deficiencies, whether they be due to machine breakdowns, low labour productivity or 
mismanagement.” Dreze, supra note 185, at 3. 
 190. See IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE TO SPEND 
INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT 141 (1930).  
 191. See id.  
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partial equilibrium framework, empowered shareholders again emerge as a 
desirable solution.  
The market structure observed in the real world, however, is quite distant 
from the idealized structure of complete markets in which everything is 
tradable in advance.192 Among other factors, transaction costs, nonverifiable 
symmetric information, and asymmetric information limit existing insurance 
opportunities.193 Under the more realistic assumption of incomplete markets, 
the argument that production is independent of shareholder preferences breaks 
down, as shareholders can no longer rely on fully contingent contracts to 
insure their future consumption needs. How to practically manage the firm’s 
assets and opportunities under a profit-maximization objective becomes a 
subjective decision, which varies with shareholder preferences.194  
Consequently, shareholder disagreement may occur—as evidenced by the 
fact that one does not generally observe unanimous shareholder 
deliberations—causing equilibrium security prices to no longer be uniquely 
defined.195 Research on specific investment criteria in the context of 
incomplete markets has accordingly concluded that even the most promising 
forms of shareholder economy result in inefficient allocations,196 unless it is 
possible to artificially replicate a mechanism of full insurance.197  
 
 192. See Dreze, supra note 185, at 3 (“Incomplete markets are the rule . . . .”); Jean-Jacques 
Laffont, A Brief Overview of the Economics of Incomplete Markets, 65 ECON. REC. 54, 54 
(1989) (“[W]hen uncertainty, information and long-term horizons are considered, the 
model [of complete competitive markets] loses most of its descriptive power.”). See 
generally 1 MAGILL & QUINZII, supra note 188, at 2-3, 2 n.1 (providing a brief account of 
the history of the theory of incomplete markets). 
 193. See Laffont, supra note 192, at 55-56 (discussing the main sources of market 
incompleteness).  
 194. See Peter M. DeMarzo, Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant 
Shareholder, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 713, 714 (1993); see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver 
D. Hart, A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 293, 293 (1979) (“In a world without a complete set of contingent 
markets . . . . firms’ profits at different dates and contingencies cannot be aggregated 
into a single index, and so profit maximization is not well-defined.”); Hart, supra note 
184, at 53-54 (“[I]n the absence of contingent commodity markets, there is in general no 
goal for a firm to pursue which represents the interests of all its shareholders.”).  
 195. See 1 MAGILL & QUINZII, supra note 188, at 384. Magill and Quinzii explain that when 
shareholders value income streams based on heterogeneous consumption preferences, 
they may differently estimate a firm’s market value, with the result that the current 
security price might fail to reflect optimal production decisions. Id. 
 196. See J. Geanakoplos et al., Generic Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium when Markets Are 
Incomplete, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 113 (1990); Michael Magill et al., A Critique of 
Shareholder Value Maximization 1 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Research Paper No. 13-16,             
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246797 (“[A] competitive 
equilibrium with shareholder value maximizing firms (capitalist equilibrium) is never 
Pareto optimal.”). 
 197. See Jacques H. Drèze, Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equilibrium and 
Stability, in ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY 129, 129-
footnote continued on next page 
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General equilibrium theory with incomplete markets thus challenges the 
claim that shareholders are optimally situated to make decisions that maximize 
firm value. Nonetheless, general equilibrium theory focuses on market 
dynamics, touching only upon institutional mechanisms (i.e., the internal 
operations of the firm).198 In order to move to a positive account of board 
empowerment, a broader theoretical approach is necessary. This Article 
develops such an approach in Subparts B and C below.  
B. Asset Pricing Theory and Shareholder Commitment 
1. Price dynamics and shareholder value 
An additional assumption on which shareholder advocates rely to defend 
shareholder empowerment is that asset prices may serve as an efficient 
informational focal point, thus mitigating asymmetric-information issues 
between firm insiders and outsiders. Board advocates reject this claim by 
asserting that the informational focal point provided by market prices is at best 
imperfect. Accordingly, discussion of asset pricing theory in corporate law can 
be described as hinging on assumptions about the greater or lesser 
informational efficiency of market prices, as reflected in the strong or semi-
strong versions of the ECMH.199 The financial economics literature, however, 
evidences a tension between two more radically opposed views of financial-
 
30 (1Jacques H. Drèze ed., 1974). Drèze proposes an investment rule under which 
shareholders are allowed to make side payments in order to reach unanimity on 
production decisions, using these payments to insure their future consumption needs 
against uncertainty. See id. at 139-42 (describing an economy in which each consumer-
owner has a vector of transfers). Although this mechanism might be theoretically 
feasible in a close corporation, operationalizing the Drèze criterion in the public 
corporation would involve prohibitively large transaction costs.  
 198. Economist Peter M. DeMarzo has investigated whether shareholder disagreement can 
be solved through institutional decision criteria such as majority voting. See DeMarzo, 
supra note 194. He showed that a majority-voting equilibrium might exist if the largest 
shareholder has complete control over the firm, as this naturally mitigates potential 
shareholder disagreement over production decisions. See id. at 714. Under the more 
common hypothesis of relative control, however, multiple price equilibria obtain, with 
the majority-voting criterion leading to unstable decisions and possibly a failure to 
select the optimal production plan. See id. Most importantly, DeMarzo also showed 
that centralized decisionmaking—board control—might offer a remedy to that failure. 
See id. at 728. On the assumption that board preferences incarnate a weighted average of 
shareholder preferences, vesting the board with control over the voting agenda—for 
example, through the attribution of veto power—can lead to optimal production 
decisions. See id. at 728-29. Under this result, empowering the board is thus a means to 
effectively address the indeterminacy and nonoptimality of production decisions in 
joint-ownership structures, rather than a source of deviation from efficient 
decisionmaking. 
 199. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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market dynamics.200 While the Hayekian view of markets substantially 
reproduces the semi-strong version of the ECMH, the Keynesian view holds 
that prices are cyclically influenced by herding and short-run speculation and 
are thus cyclically uninformative.201  
As explained by Keynes through his influential metaphor of financial 
markets as a beauty contest,202 rational herding behavior may induce investors 
to react to aggregate market demand rather than to their own information, 
because “each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds 
prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other 
competitors.”203 Understanding market prices thus requires not just an 
understanding of all market actors’ average expectations about future 
liquidation value, but also an understanding of all market actors’ beliefs about 
other market actors’ beliefs (that is, higher-order beliefs).204 Because 
consideration of higher-order beliefs incentivizes an excessive reliance on 
public information, the mean path of prices may depart from the consensus 
estimate about the fundamental value of a firm,205 negating the predictive 
power of even the semi-strong form of the ECMH.206  
 
 200. See Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek, 
79 REV. ECON. STUD. 539, 539-40 (2012). 
 201. See id. 
 202. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND 
MONEY 156 (1936). The speculative-market hypothesis has been later formalized by 
Michael Harrison and David Kreps, see J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, 
Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J. 
ECON. 323 (1978), and more recently by José Scheinkman and Wei Xiong, see José A. 
Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1183 
(2003). 
 203. KEYNES, supra note 202, at 156. 
 204. The intuition for this result can be grasped through the following illustration, which 
borrows from a work by Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris, and Hyun Song Shin. See 
Franklin Allen et al., Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets, 19 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 719, 720-21 (2006). Consider an ordinary investor who has to predict the 
value of a financial asset and has both private and public information on the asset’s 
value. If the investor knows that the asset’s value depends on the average expectation of 
its future payoff, she will put more weight on the public information than the private 
information, as only the former is observed by all individuals. See id. For additional 
discussion of higher-order beliefs in asset pricing theory, see Philippe Bacchetta & Eric 
Van Wincoop, Higher Order Expectations in Asset Pricing, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 837, 838-39 (2008); and Bruno Biais & Peter Bossaerts, Asset Prices and Trading 
Volume in a Beauty Contest, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 307, 307-09 (1998). 
 205. See Allen et al., supra note 204, at 721; Bacchetta & Van Wincoop, supra note 204, at 839. 
Under the assumption of excessive reliance on public information and higher-order 
beliefs, “if public information suggests that payoffs will be high, then this can lead to 
high asset prices even if many traders have private information that the true value is 
low”—partially explaining the occurrence of bubbles. Allen et al., supra note 204, at 741-
42. The fact that asset pricing bubbles continually emerge indirectly confirms that 
prices cyclically converge to a Keynesian equilibrium.  
 206. See Cespa & Vives, supra note 200, at 540, 566.  
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Speculative factors unrelated to the true value of market assets may also 
push prices away from fundamentals. Indeed, when the possibility of 
differential investor information is taken into account, better-informed 
investors may rationally choose to exploit their partly private information and 
act as price-makers rather than price-takers by speculating on short-run price 
differences.207 As with higher-order beliefs, the result is that the impact of 
fundamentals on market prices is sterilized, increasing the likelihood of 
mispricing.  
Once one takes into account the possibility of a Keynesian market, prices 
cannot be safely relied upon to get shareholders past the barrier of asymmetric 
information. This is especially true for corporate production involving the 
development of nonstandardized, innovative technologies, particularly where 
that production relies heavily on firm-specific employee investments. Indeed, 
information about the long-term value of these investments tends to be “soft”—
mostly limited to firm insiders—and hence less accurately reflected in market 
prices.208 By contrast, channeling resources to such investments tends to 
require large capital expenditures in the short term, which necessarily 
decreases a firm’s current earnings. This decrease in present earnings is a type 
of “hard” information that the current stock price can more easily 
incorporate.209 As a result, shareholders are more likely to misinterpret a 
short-term drop in profits as a sign of underperformance, when in reality it 
might reflect the expenses of an investment whose value will not be realized 
immediately.  
The possibility of informational inefficiency affecting shareholder 
evaluation of managerial actions helps explain why short-termism is likely to 
be a much more severe problem than the corporate law scholarship typically 
acknowledges. In the standard rendering, short-termism is considered a 
consequence of shareholder “impatience.”210 The assumption of impatient 
shareholders, however, underestimates the problem of short-termism by 
providing a motivation attributable to only some shareholders, not all of them; 
impatience cannot reasonably be said to constitute a systematic shareholder 
issue. A better explanation is that short-termism is a primary manifestation of 
the limited-commitment problem that affects all shareholders as a matter of 
course. Economically, a commitment problem arises each time decisionmakers 
have incentives to renege on prior engagements where the anticipation of this 
 
 207. See id. at 541.  
 208. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 250 (2006) (defining “soft” 
information as that which “cannot be verified by the investors”); Alex Edmans et al., 
The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency when Some Information Is Soft 2-3 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 380/2013, 2015), http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316194. 
 209. See Edmans et al., supra note 208, at 2. 
 210. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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circumstance reduces ex ante welfare.211 Something similar happens in the 
corporate context when shareholders cannot credibly commit to value-
increasing, long-term investments. In an attempt to maximize the value of 
their holdings—and unable to tell whether a short-term drop in firm outcomes 
reflects mismanagement or an investment that is slow in paying off—
shareholders will either seek a change in investment policy through board 
removal or dump their shares, increasing the likelihood of a change in 
control.212 In either case, directors and managers risk losing their jobs, with the 
result that they may rationally develop “myopic incentives,”213 passing up 
profitable long-term projects that are more likely to be mispriced or 
overinvesting in short-term projects that are less profitable.214 In a sense, the 
lack of shareholder commitment induces managers to make the decisions that 
 
 211. Supra note 30. 
 212. This description of the dynamics underlying the shareholders’ limited-commitment 
problem is consistent with investors’ average holding periods. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & 
Frédéric Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors 3, 43-44 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 342/2013, 2012), http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188661 (documenting the existence of 
increasingly shorter average holding periods by investors from 1960 to 2005); Martijn 
Cremers et al., Stock Duration, Analysts Recommendations, and Misvaluation 10-13, 31 
tbl.1 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2190437 (documenting that the average length of time a stock is held in an 
institutional portfolio is about 1.39 years). An earlier version of the latter study 
reported that holding durations of institutional investors have lengthened slightly 
since 1985 (from 1.2 years to 1.5 years). Martijn Cremers et al., Stock Duration,  
Analysts Recommendations, and Misvaluation 10-11, 30 tbl.2 (1Jan. 15, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.geneva-summit-on-sustainable-finance.ch/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/03/sautner.pdf. Nevertheless, average holding periods remain 
largely incompatible with a long-term investment horizon, which is usually set at 
around 5 years. See Dominic Barton, Capitalism for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 
2011, at 85, 86. 
 213. Rational-myopia studies were pioneered by Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, and 
Jeremy Stein. See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Repeated Auctions of Incentive 
Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers, 19 RAND J. 
ECON. 516, 529-31 (1988) (showing formally that if investments are “invisible,” high 
investments might be mistaken for low effort); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital 
Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 656-
61 (1989) (modeling suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted 
average of near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover 
Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 62-67 (1988) (showing formally that 
managers of a firm threatened by a takeover will sell an underpriced asset). 
 214. See, e.g., John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 
40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32-35 (2005) (reporting that eighty percent of surveyed chief 
financial officers declared being willing to reduce investments in research and 
development (R&D) and other long-term projects in order to meet earnings targets); 
M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1470 (1985) 
(“By selecting a project that yields short-term profits, the manager can expect to 
improve the perception about her ability . . . . [T]his potential advantage to the manager 
might outweigh the fact that from the long-term point of view the project is not the 
best available . . . .”). 
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an uninformed market wants to see, because managers anticipate that pursuing 
their informational advantage might be punished, rather than rewarded, by the 
market.215 
2. Pricing inefficiencies and ownership reconcentration 
Given these crucial implications of asset pricing inefficiency, the key 
question is: What market features drive prices to converge to a Keynesian or 
Hayekian equilibrium? An intuitive response is that capital market structures 
and investors’ underlying institutional frameworks play a key role in 
influencing asset pricing dynamics. 
As a starting point, consider Berle and Means’s classic account of 
twentieth-century capital markets.216 With their widely dispersed and passive 
shareholders, the Berle-Means markets largely share the defining features of 
Hayekian markets. Indeed, dispersed shareholders ridden with collective action 
problems fit the paradigm of price-taker investors, in that they are largely 
unable to access any differential information or the means to influence market 
trends. The new millennium, however, has seen the U.S. capital markets 
experience radical changes.217 Individual investors now mainly hold their 
equity interests through sets of intermediary institutions. Additionally, the rise 
of activist hedge funds has reduced the classic shareholder collective action 
problem, thereby giving new significance to shareholder governance. From an 
asset pricing perspective, these transformative changes seem to point to a 
higher likelihood of Keynesian prices, as they increase both the likelihood of 
herding and speculative behaviors. 
In an environment where institutional investors’ performances are 
evaluated in relative terms over fairly short periods, “beating the market” is 
now the common imperative.218 Under this imperative, herding is likely to be 
a defining market feature, because computing the beliefs of other institutional 
investors emerges almost as an intrinsic need when an investor’s portfolio is 
evaluated against a competitive benchmark. 
 
 215. See Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth Versus Margins: Destabilizing 
Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants, 63 J. FIN. 1025, 1026 (2008); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment 
in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 719-20 (1993); Adam Brandenburger & Ben Polak, 
When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See, 27 
RAND J. ECON. 523, 529, 533 (1996).  
 216. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-89 (reprint ed. 1982). 
 217. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 94, at 889-90 (describing the competitive-pressure 
mechanisms that affect the performance of institutional investors). 
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Assuming that hedge funds can serve an informational role—as recently 
suggested by Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon219—does not imply that prices 
are less likely to be Keynesian. Gilson and Gordon argue that hedge funds, 
acting as specialists in monitoring and undertaking fundamental analysis, and 
institutional investors, acting as specialists in low-cost diversification, combine 
to offer efficient, market-based stewardship of business decisions.220 The 
existence of a permanent class of informed investors, however, is not 
necessarily conducive to prices that are closer to fundamentals. In contrast, 
market-making trading that sterilizes the impact of private information, thus 
pushing current prices further away from fundamentals, might be a rational 
response for informed investors.221 Accordingly, the risk that “both 
institutional investors and activist investors may be myopic, to the end of 
increasing the value of a speculative option,”222 seems larger than assumed by 
Gilson and Gordon, with undervalued negative implications for the alleged 
efficiency of market inputs. 
In the best-case scenario, under the current market structure with 
ownership concentration in intermediary institutions, one cannot rule out the 
possibility of Keynesian prices. In the worst case, this possibility becomes 
salient. Either way, short-termism concerns—and, more generally, concerns 
about the adverse effects of the shareholder limited-commitment problem—
can no longer be dismissed as nonexistent or even of only marginal 
importance.  
 
 219. See id. at 867 (defining activist shareholders, such as hedge funds, as “governance 
intermediaries” that actively use governance levers to influence firm investment 
policy, often seeking the support of institutional shareholders). 
 220. Gilson and Gordon see the informational role served by hedge funds as capable of 
reducing what they call the “agency costs of agency capitalism.” Id. at 890, 893. This new 
kind of agency cost stems from the business model of institutional investors, which 
constrains them to assessing investments based exclusively on stock market 
performance—the only metric compatible with the competitive pressure to which they 
are subject. See id. at 889-90. In this environment, the exercise of rapid-exit rights, 
rather than corrective voice, is the ordinary response to low firm performance. See id. 
at 890-92. Thus, the informational role served by hedge funds should be seen as an 
“endogenous response to the monitoring shortfall that follows from ownership 
reconcentration in intermediary institutions.” Id. at 867. 
 221. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in 
Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 579-80 (2006) (explaining that under the 
hypothesis of speculative markets, active shareholder intervention is more likely to be 
the cause of rather than a solution to short-termism concerns); Joshua Coval & Erik 
Stafford, Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity Markets, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 479, 480-82 
(2007) (documenting that large flows by mutual fund investors lead prices of stocks 
held by the funds to shift away from fundamental value for prolonged periods of time); 
Edmans et al., supra note 169, at 935 (constructing “a measure of price pressure induced 
by mutual funds not due to informational reasons but rather to flows they face from 
investors”).  
 222. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 94, at 917.  
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C. Governance Tradeoffs and Priorities: A Contract Theory Approach 
By taking into consideration the existence of multiple sources of market 
incompleteness, incomplete-markets theory uncovers the limits of an 
analytical approach that exclusively focuses on the managerial moral hazard 
problem and thereby rejects the optimality of shareholder empowerment. 
Asset pricing theory exposes a primary source of distortions in shareholder 
incentives: their lack of commitment due to pricing inefficiencies. Yet this 
combined analysis still does not answer the question of what a desirable 
governance model for the public corporation would look like, given the 
complexity of market imperfections. In light of the competing concerns posed 
by managerial moral hazard and the shareholder limited-commitment 
problem, addressing this question demands an inquiry into the order of 
governance priorities.  
1. Dynamic contracts and renegotiation 
In investigating governance tradeoffs and priorities, we begin by revisiting 
the shareholder-manager relationship as a dynamic, long-term contract. This 
approach allows us to draw on a basic insight of contract theory: a contract is 
dynamically efficient as long as, and only if, it is renegotiation-proof.223 This 
means that the principal can commit to playing by a consistent set of rules 
irrespective of what information she may learn about the agent over the 
development of the contractual relationship.224 With full principal 
commitment, the optimal long-term contract simply replicates the initial 
optimal contract across each period of the parties’ relationship.225 Conversely, 
when the principal cannot commit to avoiding future renegotiation, the initial 
contract may fail to be incentive-compatible. Ex post (that is, after the 
principal has learned new information about the agent), renegotiation allows 
the principal to efficiently redesign the initial allocation of contractual 
entitlements. However, ex ante (that is, at the time the agent is hired), the 
possibility of future renegotiation distorts the agent’s incentives.226 Indeed, the 
agent anticipates that the principal will use any information she—the agent—
might reveal in the course of their relationship to renegotiate contractual 
entitlements. In turn, she may react to this expectation by taking actions that 
 
 223. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 303-04, 319 (2002). 
 224. See id. at 304 & n.2. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See, e.g., BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 192-95 (1997); 
Klaus M. Schmidt, Contract Renegotiation and Option Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 432, 432 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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please the principal in earlier periods but are detrimental to the principal’s 
interest in the long run.227  
A party’s ability to unilaterally renegotiate the terms of a contract is a 
special kind of renegotiation. In particular, the relationship between 
shareholders and firm insiders (i.e., directors and managers) fits this contractual 
paradigm, as shareholders can remove directors and top management or 
simply sell their shares, which may trigger a change in control and the 
replacement of incumbents. On this reconceptualization of shareholder-
manager relationships, the shareholder limited-commitment problem thus 
emerges as the combined result of asset pricing imperfections and unilateral 
renegotiation rights. Because shareholders are unable to tell whether the board 
and top managers are performing or underperforming before the full 
realization of an investment decision, they cannot credibly commit to long-
term investment strategies—in other words, shareholders cannot commit not 
to use their unilateral renegotiation rights. Under this analytical framework, 
the optimal incentive scheme needs to (i) induce managers to exert effort and 
(ii) mitigate the ex ante distortions arising from the shareholders’ inability to 
assure management they will not engage in ex post renegotiation of corporate 
contracts. The next step is considering whether a shareholder-empowerment 
model or a board-empowerment model can better approximate such an 
incentive scheme.  
2. Tradeoffs and priorities 
By facilitating board removal, shareholder empowerment strengthens the 
shareholders’ right of unilateral renegotiation. Stronger renegotiation rights 
may be a valid solution to the moral hazard problem in a static context in 
which commitment issues do not arise. In such a context, the attribution of 
such rights to the principal may have beneficial disciplinary effects on the 
agent’s incentives to exert effort, assuming renegotiation (i.e., termination) is 
costly to the agent or staying employed is very lucrative.228  
The assessment of shareholder empowerment, however, radically changes 
in a scenario involving intertemporal choices and pricing inefficiencies. In this 
scenario, the disciplinary benefits of stronger renegotiation rights come at the 
expense of exacerbating the distortion of incentives that arises from the lack of 
shareholder commitment. Indeed, directors will be more likely to prefer short-
term over long-term projects when they stand for reelection annually and, 
thereby, face a greater risk of removal upon a short-term drop in 
 
 227. See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts, 
58 ECONOMETRICA 1279, 1289-96 (1990) (modeling the problems that may arise when, at 
the interim stage, the principal is unable to tell how well the agent is performing and 
may have incentives to renegotiate the contract).  
 228. See John Y. Zhu, Myopic Agency 3-4 (May 6, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author).  
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performance.229 If the manager’s compensation is performance based (that is, 
tied to current stock prices), myopic incentives might be further exacerbated, 
as pay-for-performance schemes also punish early failures.230 This punishment 
might consist of lower rewards or even termination of the manager’s contract. 
On the other hand, however, a governance model with an empowered board 
that is protected against short-term shareholder and market pressures might 
increase the risk of directorial or managerial moral hazard, as this model limits 
disciplinary effects via the threat of shareholder renegotiation.  
Given the tradeoff posed by the competing problems of managerial moral 
hazard and lack of shareholder commitment, it makes sense to proceed by 
attempting to understand which problem should be granted priority over the 
other. We will first consider the case for privileging shareholder 
empowerment, positing that moral hazard is the more severe governance 
problem. Under the proposed reconceptualization of the shareholder-manager 
relationship, this assessment turns on an evaluation of the relative benefits of 
providing shareholders with enhanced renegotiation rights against the 
respective costs of such rights. We argue that two main factors suggest that the 
costs of shareholder empowerment are likely to exceed its benefits. 
First, as explained above, the risk of short-termism is especially 
pronounced for corporate-production processes that involve the development 
of nonstandardized, innovative technology and that rely more on specific 
human capital contributions.231 It might be tempting to downplay the 
importance of this kind of production as only affecting a restricted set of 
companies, thereby curtailing the relevance of short-termism concerns. 
However, this would underestimate the vast transformation that corporate 
production has undergone in the last thirty to forty years.232 Corporations 
 
 229. Economists Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin formally showed that the 
disciplinary effects of a decentralized-credit model, where refinancing decisions are in 
the hands of new potential investors—another form of unilateral principal 
renegotiation—may foster an overemphasis on short-term results if the realization of 
the firm’s project occurs only in the long term and if, at the interim stage, good projects 
are hardly distinguishable from bad projects. See M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, Credit 
and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 541, 541-42 
(1995). 
 230. See Gustavo Manso, Motivating Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 1823, 1823-24 (2011) (arguing that 
pay-for-performance schemes that reward or penalize managers based on near-term 
outcomes may have adverse consequences if the goal is to induce managers to explore 
new, untested investments); Zhu, supra note 228, at 1-2 (arguing that pay-for-
performance schemes that “reward[] high output today” are likely to encourage 
managers to cause the firm’s present expected output to rise, potentially at the expense 
of future returns). 
 231. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.  
 232. See Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a “Technological 
Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 99, 100 (2010) (“[T]he recent 
technological revolution, in its various manifestations, is associated with a dramatic 
footnote continued on next page 
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards 
68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
121 
born in the industrial age derived most of their value from physical assets and 
manufacturing activities. In twenty-first-century corporations, however, firm 
value increasingly depends on intangible assets, such as technological know-
how, patents, research and development projects, brand names, and trade 
secrets.233 Along the same lines, human capital has grown away from its 
neoclassical representation as an unspecified input. In part as a reflection of 
technological progress, which naturally tends to require more specific skills 
and know-how, human capital is, today, an increasingly specialized 
resource.234 As a result of these radical changes, investments in innovation and 
other long-term specific projects are no longer an exception, but arguably a 
defining feature of many twenty-first-century corporations.235  
Second, short-termism is not the only adverse consequence that a lack of 
shareholder commitment may engender. Revisiting the lack of shareholder 
commitment as a renegotiation problem introduces an additional set of 
concerns that has received little attention in recent discussions of optimal 
governance models.236 To the extent that shareholders can seek a change in 
investment policy or sell their shares whenever it benefits them, the corporate 
contracts of the firm’s various stakeholders—including suppliers, consumers, 
 
shift in the composition of investment spending and in the factors driving the growth 
of output per worker hour.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 233. As explained by Carol Corrado and Charles Hulten:  
[T]he innovation that has shaped recent economic growth is not an autonomous event that 
falls like manna from heaven. Nor is it a result of R&D and ICT investments alone. Instead, a 
surge of new ideas (technological or otherwise) is linked to output growth through a complex 
process of investments in technological expertise, product design, market development, and 
organizational capability. This process affects all sources of growth to one extent or another 
but is most clearly detected in the growing contribution of intangible capital. 
  Id. at 103. 
 234. See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles?: Employee Satisfaction 
and Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621, 622, 627-29 (2011) (“I find a strong, robust, 
positive correlation between [employee] satisfaction and shareholder returns. This 
result provides empirical support for recent theories of the firm focused on employees 
as the key assets.” (citations omitted)); Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. 
FIN. 1623, 1641-42 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of human capital over physical 
capital in today’s corporations). 
 235. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 65, 65-66 (arguing that investments in innovation 
and intangible assets are critical to any corporation’s success in today’s globalized era); 
Zingales, supra note 234, at 1640-42 (arguing that the nature of the firm has changed, 
such that human-capital intensive firms are increasingly more common today).  
 236. The new short-term/long-term perspective embraced by the corporate governance 
debate has reframed the debate as exclusively pertaining to the shareholder sphere. 
Other stakeholders’ interests—which once took center stage in corporate law 
discussions—hardly find any place in contemporary discussions about desirable 
governance models. For an exception, see Roe, supra note 79, at 1004, which rejects the 
view that short-termism concerns may offer a reason to support a stakeholder model 
of the corporation.  
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workers, and creditors—are also subject to the threat of unilateral shareholder 
renegotiation. In a classic holdup framework,237 ex post renegotiation causes 
the stakeholders’ corporate investment to lose value—the more specific their 
investments, the more value they lose. This potential for holdup distorts ex 
ante incentives to invest optimally in the firm, inducing stakeholders to 
increase the cost of their corporate performance and/or reduce the level of 
their investment.238 As with short-termism, the ultimate result is reduced firm 
value. 
The different role played by formal contracting with respect to 
shareholders’ and managers’ corporate interests, on the one hand, and 
stakeholders’ corporate interests, on the other, only partially alters the terms of 
analysis. As is well known, the shareholder-manager contract is mostly 
implicit, as the shareholders’ corporate interests are so broad as to be largely 
noncontractible.239 The stakeholders’ more limited corporate interests, 
however, can be bargained for and therefore protected by explicit contracts.240 
From a strictly legal viewpoint, the firm is the stakeholders’ contractual 
counterparty. Therefore, it could be argued that shareholder actions—such as 
seeking board removal to implement a change in investment policy—have 
limited influence on how the firm’s contractually specified relationships with 
the various stakeholders are performed. This argument, however, fails to 
consider that the long-term nature of most stakeholder contracts necessarily 
makes these contracts highly incomplete. Hence, there remain large areas for 
discretionary and legally unenforceable understandings concerning the parties’ 
performances.241 It is within these areas that the lack of shareholder 
commitment will matter the most.  
In the case of employees, for example, the employer’s right of at-will 
termination leaves significant room for the exercise of discretionary power 
and is, therefore, subject to shareholder influence via renegotiation. It appears 
to be no coincidence, then, that a standard governance intervention technique 
 
 237. A holdup problem occurs “when a transactor . . . decides it is wealth-maximizing to 
take advantage of contractual incompleteness to expropriate the rents on the specific 
investments made by its transacting partner.” Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 2 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241, 241 (Peter Newman 
ed., 1998). 
 238. Lynn Stout has proposed a similar ex ante/ex post perspective to analyze the effects of 
antitakeover defenses, criticizing past empirical studies for failing to consider the ex 
ante benefits of having such defenses. See Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses 
Decrease Shareholder Wealth?: The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 
853-56 (2002). 
 239. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1815, 1819 (2013). 
 240. See id. (discussing how outside lenders, as opposed to stockholders, can enter into 
contracts that “approach completeness”). 
 241. See Stout, supra note 238, at 847-48 (highlighting the importance of implicit corporate 
contracting). 
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of activist hedge funds is to cut the cost of labor by reducing the number of 
workers.242 A similar argument applies to suppliers and large customers who 
are engaged in long-term, firm-specific investments and are therefore 
vulnerable to changes in the firm’s operating strategy, such as those that occur 
upon board removal by the shareholders or, worse, a takeover.243 In the case of 
creditors, the problem arises out of the shareholders’ preference for high-risk, 
high-return projects, because shareholders expect to reap the full upside of 
these projects if things go well. If things turn awry, however, creditors bear 
most of the downside risk.244 In light of these preferences, the shareholders’ 
ability to influence a firm’s investment policy—for example, by using the 
threat of removal to pressure the board—could have dramatic consequences for 
creditors, especially considering that risk is a variable that is difficult to 
bargain for ex ante.  
The pervasive risk of short-termism that accompanies modern corporate 
production and the salience of the stakeholder problem provide theoretical 
support for arguing that the costs of shareholder empowerment exceed its 
benefits. The final step in our theoretical inquiry is thus making the case for a 
model of board empowerment, positing that the lack of shareholder 
commitment is the more severe governance problem.  
3. Empowered boards as commitment devices 
Under the reconceptualization of the lack of shareholder commitment as a 
renegotiation problem, the adoption of a staggered, empowered board emerges 
as desirable to mitigate the value-reducing distortions that the threat of 
shareholder renegotiation may engender in managers and stakeholders. A 
staggered board mitigates these distortions by functioning as a commitment 
device through which shareholders can bind themselves ex ante to not 
unilaterally renegotiate manager or stakeholder contracts in the short term, 
thereby improving their position ex post.245  
 
 242. See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset 
Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2724, 2748-52 (2015). 
 243. For earlier studies exploring the inefficiencies arising from the possibility that business 
strategies might revert through a change in control, see Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. 
Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988), which focuses on shareholder-
stakeholder relationships. See also Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark 
Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 155, 166 (1986) (stating that 
antitakeover defenses may be beneficial to constrain shareholder opportunism). 
 244. See, e.g., Sepe, supra note 30, at 332, 338. 
 245. Other corporate law scholars have explored the idea that staggered boards may serve as 
a (pre-)commitment device to increase the board’s bargaining power and the expected 
returns of target shareholders during a takeover. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 177, at 
484 & n.32 (quoting other studies discussing the benefits of enhanced board power 
within the takeover context). Unlike these scholars, this Article argues that staggered 
boards are more relevant to corporate governance and firm value before a takeover 
footnote continued on next page 
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards 
68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
124 
From a tradeoff perspective, however, the question remains whether the 
benefits of board insulation come at the expense of a higher risk of directorial 
or managerial moral hazard. Empirically speaking, our results do not show 
such a linkage. Indeed, the positive time-series association of staggered boards 
and firm value indicates that any potential increase in costs due to managerial 
moral hazard is generally more than compensated for by the benefits accruing 
from committing shareholders more strongly to long-term investment 
projects. 
Theoretically speaking, the potential tradeoff posed by empowered boards 
is less problematic than that posed by empowered shareholders. Indeed, several 
instruments remain available to constrain moral hazard once the shareholder 
limited-commitment problem has been taken care of through an empowered 
board. First, with shareholders committed to long-term projects, pay-for-
performance schemes can effectively be used to constrain managerial moral 
hazard without increasing the risk of short-termism.246 Second, while a board 
that is empowered through a staggering provision makes replacing firm 
insiders more difficult, it does not make them irremovable.247 Corporations 
with a staggered board incarnate a representative-democracy model, not a 
dictatorship. The traditionalist view, as observed by Chief Justice Strine, posits 
that “[i]f investors truly believe that a board is governing poorly and hiding 
behind its classified status,” they can elect their own slate of directors to the 
board, “who can then change the system. And if you don’t want to take 
responsibility for governing, don’t mess with the folks who do.”248  
Shareholder advocates might counter that there is no reported instance of 
a bidder persevering through the two-year delay required by a staggered board 
to replace a majority of directors.249 Yet this evidence is not enough to 
conclude that staggered boards create an insurmountable barrier to the 
 
occurs. With a staggered board in place, both managers and stakeholders are protected 
from the adverse effects arising from the shareholders’ lack of commitment. This 
protection gives managers and stakeholders incentives to optimally invest in the firm. 
From this perspective, the theory of empowered boards is closer in spirit to the 
director-primacy theory of Stephen Bainbridge, see Bainbridge, supra note 59, and the 
team-production theory of Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, see Blair & Stout, supra note 
59. The theory outlined here, however, is grounded on asset pricing considerations, on 
which neither Bainbridge’s director-primacy nor Blair and Stout’s team-production 
theories focus.  
 246. With committed shareholders, compensation schemes inherently exhibit more 
“tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long-term success,” 
mitigating the potential distortive effect of classic pay-for-performance schemes. 
Manso, supra note 230, at 1824.  
 247. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 890 (stating that effective staggered boards are “a 
powerful, even if not insurmountable, antitakeover device” (emphasis added)).  
 248. Strine, supra note 59, at 1773. 
 249. See Subramanian, supra note 127, at 6. 
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replacement of incumbents. For one thing, it could be that the refusal of a 
bidder to wait through the two-year election cycle reflects an inefficient bid, as 
suggested by prior empirical work highlighting that “it remains unclear 
whether the takeover bids that might obtain in the absence of board 
classification would be efficient for target shareholders.”250 Moreover, the 
increased incidence of nominally friendly acquisitions suggests both that 
market discipline has persisted notwithstanding staggered boards and that 
board replacement does not necessarily demand hostility.251 Finally, liability 
rules and court intervention remain available to shareholders seeking to 
address instances of outrageous managerial moral hazard or violations of 
fiduciary duty.252  
No comparable remedies are available to mitigate the shareholder limited-
commitment problem under a model with empowered shareholders, other 
than the presence of a controlling shareholder.253 Indeed, several factors 
combine to make a controlling shareholder’s commitment to a firm’s long-
term investment strategy more credible. First, the cost of selling a large block is 
greater.254 Second, controlling shareholders enjoy better access to firm 
information.255 Third, they are more likely to be subject to reputational 
sanctions if they default on a prior commitment.256 The presence of a 
controlling shareholder, however, is not a choice “available” to corporate 
actors, but the endogenous result of capital market dynamics.  
To put the results of our inquiry into corporate governance tradeoffs and 
priorities in economic terms, a desirable governance model needs to solve a 
 
 250. Bates et al., supra note 108, at 658. 
 251. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 676 (“[T]he revival of private equity buyouts 
showed that disciplinary merger activity can proliferate even in the absence of either 
actual or threatened hostile bids.”).  
 252. Courts’ traditional reluctance to challenge director primacy in deciding whether to 
adopt antitakeover defenses, see supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text, might 
indicate that outrageous moral hazard is an unlikely possibility, consistent with this 
Article’s empirical analysis.  
 253. See supra note 198. 
 254. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 375, 375-76 (1983) (describing how diversified ownership impedes shareholder 
control and therefore profit maximization); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 461-62 (1986) (describing how 
only large shareholders can profitably monitor management).  
 255. Controlling shareholders often hold board seats (directly or through a representative), 
which helps explain their informational advantage. Cf. Clifford G. Holderness & 
Dennis P. Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An 
Exploratory Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 317, 324 (1988) (reporting that majority 
shareholders or their representatives almost always serve as directors or officers). 
 256. Greater reputation follows from the position of controllers as directors. Cf. Renée B. 
Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual 
Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 95-96 (2010) (offering a survey of the 
literature on boards’ reputational issues).  
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constrained-optimization problem: it must minimize moral hazard while 
committing shareholders to long-term value creation. Board empowerment 
better approximates that model.  
IV. The Empirics of the Shareholder Limited-Commitment Problem 
The theory of board empowerment developed in Part III explains the 
constructive role of staggered boards that emerges from our time-series 
analysis. The source of the value added by a staggered board lies in credibly 
committing shareholders to long-term engagements vis-à-vis directors, 
managers, and stakeholders. As such, the promotion of long-term projects and 
optimal stakeholder firm-specific investments emerge as the two main 
transmission channels through which staggered boards positively impact firm 
value. This analysis also suggests that the conventional view of the tradeoff 
posed by board empowerment is inaccurate. Empirically, staggering up a board 
does not seem to come at the expense of entrenching directors and managers 
and thereby increasing managerial moral hazard.  
This Part subjects the claim that staggered boards add value by mitigating 
the shareholder limited-commitment problem to additional empirical testing. 
The ensuing empirical analysis investigates whether the data support our 
theoretical predictions about (i) identified transmission channels and (ii) the 
tradeoff between having a staggered board and moral hazard. As discussed 
below, for both inquiries, the empirical results strongly support our theoretical 
predictions.  
A. Transmission Mechanisms  
1. Innovation and intangible assets 
The above theoretical analysis suggests that the shareholder limited-
commitment problem is likely to be most severe when corporate production 
involves the development of nonstandardized, innovative technology and 
relies more on firm-specific human capital—as happens in many of today’s 
corporations.257 Accordingly, having a staggered board should be more 
strongly related to increased financial value for corporations with more 
innovation and long-term, specific investments. 
This Article employs two variables to capture these features of corporate 
production: R&D—a proxy for the importance of long-term research and 
development projects (retrieved from Compustat), and Intangible Assets—a 
proxy for a firm’s level of information asymmetry (also retrieved from 
 
 257. See supra Part III.B.1.  
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Compustat). On the one hand, R&D is a standard measure of innovation,258 and 
encouraging managers to specifically invest in both physical assets and human 
capital is essential to innovating new products and operations. On the other 
hand, investments in intangible assets such as technological know-how, 
advertising, patents, software development, brand names, and trade secrets are 
all likely to figure prominently on the balance sheets of most modern 
corporations, although in different proportions and combinations. These 
investments typically involve an intrinsically higher level of informational 
asymmetry than tangible assets, whose production tends to follow more 
standardized investment plans.259 Hence, if long-term, specific investments can 
explain the positive impact of staggered boards on firm value, one would 
expect that impact to be greater in firms with higher levels of R&D and 
Intangible Assets.  
Table 3 below shows the results for pooled-panel Q regressions on 
Staggered Board both with and without its interactions with R&D and Intangible 
Assets (plus the standard controls). 
 
Table 3 
Firm Value, Staggered Boards, and  
Proxies for Innovation and Intangible Assets* 
Dependent Variable: Q 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) 
Staggered Board 
0.071** -0.024 
(2.44) (-0.96) 
R&D  
0.39  
(0.56)  
Intangible Assets 
 -0.143 
 (-1.64) 
R&D * Staggered Board 
1.956**  
(2.54)  
Intangible Assets * Staggered Board 
 0.164*** 
 (3.51) 
Fixed Effects: Year + Firm 
N 30,979 27,519 
R-Squared 0.72 0.74 
 
 258. See Edwin Mansfield, R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in R&D, PATENTS, 
AND PRODUCTIVITY 127, 127-29 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984), http://www.nber.org 
/chapters/c10047.pdf. 
 259. See, e.g., Edmans et al., supra note 208, at 2. 
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* This Table presents the time-series associations between firm value and the presence 
of a staggered board using the full time period 1978-2011. All columns include the 
independent variable Staggered Board plus the set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, 
CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. Column (1) adds the interaction between R&D 
and Staggered Board, and Column (2) adds the interaction between Intangible Assets and 
Staggered Board. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown in order to save space. 
The estimates use pooled-panel Tobin’s Q regressions including both year and firm 
fixed effects. Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the 
coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based 
on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
The results of Table 3 strongly support the theoretical prediction that the 
adoption of a staggered board is more valuable to firms where the shareholders’ 
limited-commitment problem tends to be more severe, such as firms with 
more innovation and long-term specific investments. Indeed, these results 
show that a staggered board is related to changes in firm value considerably 
more strongly in firms with more R&D and Intangible Assets. For example, the 
interaction of R&D * Staggered Board (see Column (1)) has a positive and both 
statistically and economically significant coefficient. In particular, firms whose 
R&D is one standard deviation higher than the mean (i.e., “high R&D” firms) 
experience a 7.4% higher Q after staggering up relative to firms whose R&D is 
at the mean.260 This result means that firms that are more invested in 
development and innovation benefit more from having a staggered board. 
Remarkably, as compared to the direct economic effect of Staggered Board, the 
economic effect of Staggered Board for high R&D firms is nearly 11.9%.261 
Likewise, firms with Intangible Assets (see Column (2)) that are one standard 
deviation higher than the mean present a 2.5% higher Q if they stagger up, 
relative to firms with average Intangible Assets.262 As for more innovative firms, 
this result means that firms engaged in investments that imply more 
asymmetric information benefit more from having a staggered board.263  
 
 260. The economic significance of the interacted impact of R&D and Staggered Board on Q is 
calculated by dividing the regression coefficient of 1.956, times the standard deviation 
of R&D of 0.06, by the sample average Q during 1978-2011 of 1.58. 
 261. The total economic significance of Staggered Board on Q for high R&D firms is 
calculated by summing the economic significance of the interacted impact of R&D and 
Staggered Board on Q (i.e., 7.4%) and adding the economic significance of Staggered Board 
alone on Q. The latter is calculated by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.071 by 
1.58 (the sample average Q during 1978-2011), which delivers 4.5%.  
 262. The economic significance of the interacted impact of Intangible Assets and Staggered 
Board on Q is calculated by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.164, times the 
standard deviation of Intangible Assets of 0.24, by the sample average Q during 1978-2011 
of 1.58. 
 263. This evidence is consistent with prior finance studies documenting that investments in 
R&D and intangibles tend to be associated with higher firm value in the long term, 
while often being underestimated in the short term, which suggests the existence of 
footnote continued on next page 
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2. Stakeholder participation 
The theoretical analysis presented in Part III of this Article further 
indicates that the limited-commitment problem would be most severe for 
firms whose business by nature requires more commitment between the 
corporation and one or more of its stakeholders.264 Empirically, one should 
thus find that the adoption of a staggered board has a greater positive impact 
on firm value in these firms, as they should benefit more from securing the 
long-term engagement of shareholders toward stakeholders.  
This Article tries to capture the need for more intense stakeholder 
commitment using three different variables as proxies: Large Customer, Labor 
Productivity, and Contract Specificity. Large Customer is an indicator variable set 
equal to one if the firm has at least one customer accounting for ten percent or 
more of its sales, which we use as a proxy for the importance of (long-term) 
firm customers in creating financial value.265 Labor Productivity identifies 
industries with a higher marginal product of labor and hence, more firm-
specific investments by the employees.266 Finally, Contract Specificity is a proxy 
for relationship-specific investments.267 Firms in industries with higher 
Contract Specificity use a higher fraction of inputs (i.e., products and services) 
that are not sold on an organized exchange or reference priced in a trade 
publication and for which the market thus appears less complete. As a result, 
the engagement in these contracts requires more firm-specific investments and 
more firm commitment.268 Two of these proxies, Labor Productivity and 
Contract Specificity, are at the industry level and thus have the advantage of 
being arguably not (fully) under the firm’s control, which mitigates 
endogeneity concerns. Indeed, using features that are shared by all firms within 
a given industry reduces the risk that differences in Tobin’s Q can result from 
 
severe information asymmetry problems. See, e.g., Louis K.C. Chan et al., The Stock 
Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures, 56 J. FIN. 2431, 2431-34 (2001); 
Allan C. Eberhart et al., An Examination of Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns and 
Operating Performance Following R&D Increases, 59 J. FIN. 623, 623-27 (2004).  
 264. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.  
 265. Data for Large Customer come from the historic Compustat Segment tapes for 1986-
2007. About a quarter of firms in the sample have a Large Customer.  
 266. Data for Labor Productivity are at the industry level and come from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (using the four digit SIC code) and is available for only a subset of firms. 
 267. This variable is borrowed from a study by Nathan Nunn. Nathan Nunn, Relationship-
Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade, 122 Q.J. ECON. 569 (2007). Data 
for Contract Specificity are at the industry level for 1997 and made available at Nathan 
Nunn’s website. See Nathan Nunn, Data, HARV. UNIV., http://scholar.harvard.edu 
/nunn/pages/data-0 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). This variable is available only for about a 
quarter of the industries in the sample and is set as “missing” if unavailable.  
 268. On asset specificity, see generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 52-56 (1985). 
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unobserved firm characteristics that determine both the adoption of a 
staggered board and more firm-specific investments.  
Table 4 below presents the results of pooled-panel Q regressions on 
Staggered Board both with and without interactions with the aforementioned 
commitment proxies (plus the standard controls). 
 
  Table 4 
Firm Value, Staggered Boards, and  
Proxies for Stakeholder Relationships* 
Dependent Variable: Q[t] 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) 
Staggered Board 
0.043 -0.0493 -0.249 
(1.45) (-0.91) (-1.45) 
Large Customer 
-0.085***   
(-3.26)   
Large Customer * Staggered Board 
0.073***   
(2.38)   
Labor Productivity  
 -0.227***  
 (-8.31)  
Labor Productivity * Staggered Board 
 0.0994***  
 (3.74)  
Contract Specificity 
  -0.726** 
  (-2.01) 
Contract Specificity * Staggered Board 
  0.362 
  (1.62) 
Fixed Effects: Year + Firm 
N 30,797 24,880 9628 
R-Squared 0.715 0.748 0.695 
* This Table presents the time-series associations between firm value and the presence 
of a staggered board using the full time period 1978-2011. All columns include the 
independent variable Staggered Board, plus the set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, 
CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. Column (1) adds the interaction between Large 
Customer and Staggered Board, Column (2), the interaction between Labor Productivity 
and Staggered Board, and Column (3), the interaction between Contract Specificity and 
Staggered Board. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. The 
estimates use pooled-panel Tobin’s Q regressions, including year and firm fixed effects. 
Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is 
indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm.  
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As shown in Table 4, all interaction coefficients have positive signs, 
although results are statistically stronger for Large Customer and Labor 
Productivity. Specifically, as shown in Column (1), the interaction of Staggered 
Board and Large Customer has a positive and both statistically and economically 
significant coefficient equal to 4.6% (t-statistic of 2.38).269 This result suggests 
that the decision to adopt or remove a staggered board is associated with a 
substantially larger increase and decrease, respectively, in firm value for firms 
with a large customer. The interaction between Staggered Board and Labor 
Productivity (Column (2)) also has a positive and both strongly statistically and 
economically significant coefficient. Economically, the coefficient implies that 
if a firm is in an industry whose labor productivity is a standard deviation 
above the average, the adoption of a staggered board is associated with a 3.9% 
greater increase in firm value270 compared to firms in industries with average 
labor productivity. The coefficient of the interaction between Staggered Board 
and Contract Specificity in Column (3) is also positive, but statistically 
insignificant (t-statistic of 1.62, with an associated p-value of 0.105). We note, 
however, that Contract Specificity is available only for a limited sample,271 
which might help explain the lack of statistical evidence.  
These results strongly support the view that staggered boards help commit 
shareholders and directors to a longer horizon vis-à-vis other stakeholders 
because adopting (or removing) a staggered board is more strongly related to 
changes in firm value for (1) firms with large long-term customers, indicating a 
mutual longer-term commitment between the firm and those customers;272   
(2) firms in industries requiring relationship-specific investments or operating 
in markets that are more incomplete; and (3) firms with more firm-specific 
labor productivity, or whose employee commitment is more important for 
value creation.  
 
 269. The economic significance of the interacted impact of Large Customer and Staggered 
Board on Q is calculated by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.073 by the sample 
average Q during 1978-2011 of 1.58. 
 270. The economic significance of the interacted impact of Labor Productivity and Staggered 
Board on Q is calculated by dividing the regression coefficient of 0.0994, times the 
standard deviation of Labor Productivity of 0.62, by the sample average Q during 1978-
2011 of 1.58. 
 271. See supra note 267. 
 272. This evidence is consistent with the result of Johnson et al., supra note 32, at 309, 
documenting that the adoption of antitakeover defenses in IPOs exhibiting firm-
specific relationships with customers, suppliers, and strategic partners is associated 
with increased firm value.  
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B. What Really Matters in Corporate Governance? 
As discussed in Part II.C.1, a substantial body of empirical literature has 
employed aggregate governance indices to measure how insulating managers 
and boards from shareholder and market pressures affects firm value. The      
G-Index and the E-Index are among the best known of these indices.273 The   
G-Index aggregates several entrenchment provisions, including staggered 
boards, and finds a negative correlation with firm value.274 The E-Index retains 
only six of the G-Index’s original provisions (in order to limit methodological 
concerns arising from the G-Index’s inclusion of an excessive number of 
provisions): staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority 
requirements for merger, supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, and supermajority requirements for bylaws amendments.275 For 
the authors of the E-Index, these six provisions are what “really matter for firm 
value,”276 as they find that such provisions “fully drive” the negative 
correlation with firm value identified by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
study.277 However, both studies consider different provisions individually 
rather than in particular combinations.278 Thus, it could be that staggered 
boards serve a different function depending on whether they are adopted in 
isolation or in combination with other provisions that are included in the       
G-Index or the E-Index. This hypothesis suggests that the benefits and costs of 
a staggered board vary depending on the existence or absence of other 
provisions.  
Specifically, when a firm employs a staggered board, but has not adopted 
the other provisions included in the above indices, it could be that the 
commitment function dominates. By contrast, when a firm adopts a staggered 
board in combination with other provisions included in the indices, the 
entrenchment function might dominate—contrary to our conclusion that the 
adoption of a staggered board does not lead to increased entrenchment. 
Empirically, we test for this hypothesis by investigating the interactions 
between the adoption of a staggered board and the other provisions included in 
the G-Index and the E-Index. If adopting a staggered board serves a value-
decreasing entrenchment function when used in combination with the 
provisions of the indices, we should find that a staggered board’s positive effect 
on firm value in the time-series analysis becomes negative when interacting 
with these provisions.  
 
 273. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 110, at 785, 789-91. 
 276. Id. at 824. 
 277. Id. at 823. 
 278. See id. at 805.  
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Table 5 presents the results of the pooled-panel Q regressions on Staggered 
Board with and without its interactions with the G-Index and the E-Index. In 
the analysis of both the G-Index (Columns (1) and (2)) and the E-Index 
(Columns (4) and (5)), Staggered Board is removed in computing the indices in 
order to separate its effect on firm value. For robustness, Columns (3) and (6) 
estimate the impact of each index on firm value after including Staggered Board. 
 
Table 5 
Firm Value, Staggered Boards, and Governance Indices* 
Dependent Variable: Q 
Independent 
Variables: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Staggered Board  
0.0655** 0.051 0.0981** 0.0806*  
(2.20) (1.01) (2.54) (1.77) 
 
G-Index 
(without SB) 
-0.0134** 0.0154**  
(-2.43) (-2.39) 
 
G-Index 
(without SB) * 
Staggered Board  
 0.00361  
 
(0.64) 
 
G-Index  
-0.00995*  
 
(-1.81) 
 
E-Index (without 
SB) 
 -0.0317** -0.0420**  
 
(-2.54) (-2.29) 
 
E-Index (without 
SB) * Staggered 
Board 
 0.0168  
 
(0.83) 
 
E-Index   
-0.00929 
 
(-0.79) 
Fixed Effects: Year + Firm 
N 22,748 22,748 22,748 21,453 21,453 21,453 
R-Squared 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.762 0.762 0.761 
* In this Table, we present the time-series associations between firm value and the 
presence of a staggered board using the full time period 1978-2011. All columns include 
the independent variable Staggered Board, plus the set of standard controls: Assets, ROA, 
CAPX, R&D, and Industry M&A Volume. Column (2) adds the interaction between           
G-Index (without SB) and Staggered Board, and Column (4) between E-Index (without SB) 
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and Staggered Board. Coefficients on standard controls are not shown to save space. The 
estimates use pooled-panel Q regressions including year and firm fixed effects. 
Variables are defined in Appendix Table A. Statistical significance of the coefficients is 
indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust 
standard errors clustered by firm.  
 
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 5 focus on the G-Index. We begin, in 
Column (1), by estimating the time-series association of Staggered Board and the 
G-Index (without SB) with firm value. We find that the coefficient on Staggered 
Board is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the          
G-Index (without SB) is negative and statistically significant. This result seems to 
suggest that the adoption of a staggered board is not a primary driver of 
entrenchment, as the G-Index provisions continue to have a negative effect    
on firm value once we remove Staggered Board from the index. Next, in 
Column (2), we estimate the commingled effect of Staggered Board and the        
G-Index (without SB). We find that the interaction is insignificant, which 
similarly contradicts the hypothesis that adopting other entrenching features 
changes the function served by staggered boards. This interpretation is 
strengthened by the result we obtain in Column (3), which shows the effect of 
the G-Index on firm value once we include Staggered Board. While the 
coefficient remains negative and significant, the economic magnitude of the 
effect is substantially reduced as compared to the results we obtain in     
Column (1) (where we removed Staggered Board). This suggests that staggered 
boards are not a complement to other entrenching features, but rather 
constrain any negative effects produced by the adoption of such features on 
firm value.  
Columns (4) through (6) present results from a similar analysis for the       
E-Index. In Column (4), we show the separate effects of Staggered Board and the 
E-Index (without SB) on firm value. As for the G-Index (without SB), we find that 
the coefficient on the E-Index (without SB) is negative and statistically 
significant, while the coefficient on Staggered Board is positive and statistically 
significant. Similar to the result we obtain for the G-Index, this result seems to 
suggest that the adoption of a staggered board is not a primary driver of 
entrenchment, as the E-Index provisions continue to have a negative effect on 
firm value once we remove Staggered Board from the index. In Column (5), we 
find that the coefficient interaction on the E-Index (without SB) is statistically 
insignificant, which again suggests that adopting other entrenching features 
does not change firm value, regardless of how effective such provisions are in 
promoting entrenchment. Finally, in Column (6), we find that the effect of the 
E-Index on firm value becomes statistically insignificant once we include 
Staggered Board. This result radically negates the thesis that the adoption of a 
staggered board is a primary driver of entrenchment and, conversely, 
reinforces the theory that staggering up might reduce the detrimental effects 
that entrenching provisions have on firm value.  
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V. Rescuing American Corporate Law  
Everyone in the current corporate governance debate agrees on one thing: 
the corporate landscape has been transformed by unprecedented changes. 
Unanimous consent also exists on the overall result of this transformation: 
shareholders have never been as empowered as they are today.279 
Disagreement, however, occurs when it comes to assessing the normative 
consequences of this result. Unsurprisingly, shareholder advocates are not 
satisfied with the gains they have already made. Notwithstanding the 
remarkable success they have had in advancing their reform agenda, they see 
shareholder empowerment as not yet accomplished.280 More surprisingly, 
even scholars who acknowledge the risks posed by increasing shareholder 
authority conceive of newly empowered shareholders as a market-driven 
correction—an endogenous corporate governance change that should be 
granted the favorable normative presumption accorded to private 
arrangements.281 
Once market imperfections are fully taken into account, however, the 
theoretical proposition that existing corporate governance arrangements are 
necessarily optimal breaks down. As we have shown, with incomplete markets 
there is no assurance that observed security prices and governance 
arrangements (such as current shareholder empowerment) reflect optimal 
decisions.282 Market imperfections thus provide an economic justification for 
allocation of authority consistent with the traditional board-centric structure 
of corporate governance. Granting formal authority over the corporation to 
the board succeeds where private ordering fails because board control 
constrains the value-reducing consequences of shareholder disagreement and 
asset pricing inefficiencies.  
In the shareholder-empowerment era, however, shareholders have 
transformed into corporate stewards, gaining increased power to shape 
corporate governance rules and even influence the substance of corporate 
decisions. Board power has correspondingly eroded. These changes to the 
balance of corporate power struck under the received board-centric model 
jeopardize that model’s continuing ability to deliver efficient outcomes. As 
shown by the empirical and theoretical analysis developed in this Article, 
weaker boards and stronger shareholders are likely to exacerbate the 
 
 279. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 231-32 (discussing the substantial gains made by 
shareholder advocates in recent years); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 1 (“At 
some point during the last decade everyone in corporate law woke up to a change in 
the fact pattern: shareholders are no longer disempowered.”); Klausner, supra note 114, 
at 1329 (arguing that the balance of corporate power has shifted toward shareholders). 
 280. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 671-73 (illustrating the law-reform agenda of 
shareholder advocates). 
 281. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 55, at 33. 
 282. See supra Part III.A.  
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shareholders’ limited-commitment problem, with detrimental effects for both 
shareholders and society as a whole. Hence, the current state of affairs in 
corporate governance calls for a recalibration of the power distribution 
between boards and shareholders. When one considers the added complication 
that regulatory intervention has bent to the shareholder paradigm’s reform 
agenda, that call becomes even more urgent.  
Having established that shareholder empowerment is a problem that needs 
to be addressed, we next explore the two possible paths to reform: the first 
considers proposals to disempower shareholders, while the second focuses on a 
proposal to reempower boards. 
A. Disempowering Shareholders 
Recent proposals to disempower shareholders have included amending 
current proxy rules to reduce the scope and frequency of shareholder 
proposals,283 extending the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders to 
activist minorities,284 adopting tax strategies to encourage longer holding 
periods for institutional investors,285 expanding SEC disclosure requirements 
for activist investors,286 and imposing stricter SEC regulation on proxy 
advisory services.287  
A detailed discussion of each of these proposals is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, a general concern with the potential reforms just mentioned 
is whether implementation would be sufficient to recalibrate the balance of 
 
 283. See Bainbridge, supra note 63, at 246 (proposing, among other measures, to turn        
Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Act of 1933, which enables the submission of shareholder 
proposals, into a default provision, as opposed to a mandatory one). 
 284. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1295-1300 (2008).  
 285. See, e.g., Aspen Inst., Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More Responsible 
Approach to Investment and Business Management 3 (2009), http://www 
.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf 
(proposing to tax capital gains on a sliding scale at a rate that is inversely proportional 
to the length of time a stock has been held); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to 
Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 101, 109 (1989) (making an 
early proposal along the same lines). 
 286. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 13, at 499 (theorizing about the adoption of a system where 
“[t]here was complete, up-to-date information about the economic interests of 
stockholders who have to file under Schedule 13D”); Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 
Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RM 
No. 4-624 (SEC Mar. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf 
(proposing amendments to Rule 13-d to require disclosure within one day of gaining 
five percent beneficial ownership and to expand the definition of beneficial ownership 
under the reporting rules).  
 287. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 13, at 499 (suggesting that a traditionalist would propose to 
prevent institutional investors from “rely[ing] upon proxy advisory firms’ 
recommendations that did not reflect the investment horizons and investing strategy 
of their investors”).  
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power between boards and shareholders. These proposals would arguably help 
to eliminate the externalities introduced by regulatory changes supporting 
shareholder empowerment. Nevertheless, they seem incapable of reversing the 
much larger changes to the traditional allocation of corporate powers ushered 
in by market forces. It is implausible that the new bargaining leverage 
shareholders have gained from the combination of ownership reconcentration 
and the rise of hedge funds will roll back any time soon. Thus, attempts to 
disempower shareholders might ultimately fail, absent complementary reform 
intervention to reempower boards. 
Reempowering boards might provide a better strategy to restore an 
economically efficient balance of corporate powers. Consistent with this 
Article’s theoretical and empirical results on the merits of staggered boards, we 
argue that strengthening a board’s ability to use staggered elections effectively 
to gain protection from short-term shareholder and market pressures serves 
that purpose. 
B. (Re-)Empowering Boards 
In order to mitigate the value-reducing distortions arising from 
shareholder and market pressures, this Article proposes the following reforms: 
(1) adopting rules to make staggered elections quasi-mandatory, and (2) giving 
boards exclusive power over charter amendments that opt out of the staggered 
board system. By reempowering U.S. boards vis-à-vis shareholders, such 
reforms would promote long-term value creation that is in the interest of 
shareholders themselves and society as a whole.  
As discussed in Part I.A, charter-established staggered boards can be 
removed only with the bilateral approval of the board and the shareholders, in 
contrast to bylaw-established staggered boards, which can be unilaterally 
altered by shareholders. This distinction explains why only the former are 
usually described as “effective” means of insulating the board from shareholder 
and market pressures.  
But how effective are charter-based staggered boards today? Based on the 
increased percentage of firms that agree to destagger their boards as a result of 
shareholder pressure,288 it seems not very. This evidence runs contrary to the 
conventional account that describes effective staggered boards as a strong 
insulation mechanism—one that cannot be dismantled without first winning 
control of the board, which commonly requires waiting two election cycles.289 
Indeed, under the pressure of proxy advisory firms and the threat of vote-
withholding campaigns,290 boards have grown increasingly receptive to 
shareholder destaggering proposals. The result is a substantial weakening of 
 
 288. See supra Part II.B. 
 289. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 97. 
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the insulating power of even allegedly effective staggered boards. After all, as 
mentioned above, the Harvard SRP alone has contributed to board 
destaggering “at about 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies” in just three 
years.291  
Increased destaggering thus emerges as a primary manifestation of the 
current trend toward the erosion of board power. Under Delaware law, the 
board retains the exclusive right to begin charter amendments—including, in 
principle, amendments to existing staggering provisions.292 However, 
shareholder precatory proposals, combined with the new bargaining leverage 
gained by shareholders, enable shareholders to initiate changes in charter-based 
staggering provisions from a de facto standpoint. The result is a shift in formal 
authority from the board to the shareholders that contributes to moving 
corporate law in an inefficient direction by destroying the “commitment 
value” of staggered boards. Indeed, the theory of board empowerment has 
shown that staggered boards serve as a value-increasing commitment device 
that helps mitigate the ex ante distortionary effects of the shareholder limited-
commitment problem. What makes a commitment credible, however, is the 
level of difficulty encountered in attempting to renege on the commitment ex 
post.293 Thus, shareholders’ ability to coerce board approval to destagger 
weakens substantially the corrective mechanism provided by a staggered 
board.  
In response, this Article proposes that the adoption of staggered elections 
be a quasi-mandatory rule. The defining feature of such rules is to set a default 
from which it is difficult to opt out, by providing for a regime that raises 
barriers to the parties’ ability to adopt a nondefault alternative.294 As explained 
by Ian Ayres, quasi-mandatory rules are desirable when the legislature’s goal is 
“to disproportionately block the more socially problematic opt-outs, while not 
blocking the less socially problematic opt-outs.”295 Applied to staggered boards, 
the “more socially problematic opt-outs” are those initiated by the 
shareholders, which coerce board approval. Conversely, the “less socially 
problematic opt-outs” are those initiated by the board itself and approved by a 
large majority of shareholders. Unlike the former opt-outs, the latter are the 
result of both vertical agreement (between the board and the shareholders) and 
horizontal agreement (among the shareholders themselves); hence, they are 
more likely to overcome the problems of indeterminacy and nonoptimality of 
production decisions that arise under joint ownership.296  
 
 291. SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, supra note 128; see also supra text accompanying note 132. 
 292. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 293. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 177, at 517 (“[A] precommitment is only as strong as the 
obstacles to subsequent reversal.”).  
 294. See Ayres, supra note 35, at 2084-88.  
 295. Id. at 2088. 
 296. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. 
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Under the proposed regime, the board should have exclusive authority to 
initiate a charter amendment to opt out of the staggered board default. In order 
to guarantee the effectiveness of the board’s initiation power, Rule 14a-8 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which allows shareholders to submit precatory 
proposals,297 should be amended to exclude destaggering proposals from the 
range of admissible proposals. This would substantially reduce the leverage 
that activist shareholders currently have against boards and, in turn, the risk of 
coerced board approval to destagger. In its strongest version, this proposal 
would also involve rolling back majority voting standards by mandating the 
adoption of plurality voting standards. This additional reform would eliminate 
the ability of shareholders to use withhold campaigns to induce a corporation’s 
directors to dismantle a staggered board. Moreover, in order to ensure 
widespread shareholder agreement, the board’s destaggering proposal should 
be subject to a two-thirds supermajority requirement.298  
As compared to proposals that have suggested replacing the current annual 
elections default with a triennial- (or quinquennial-) election default299 (neither 
of which would be difficult to opt out of), our proposal offers the advantage of 
making socially problematic opt-outs more difficult. Indeed, adopting a default 
that is easy to opt out of would jeopardize the very purpose of adopting such a 
default in the first place.300  
 
 297. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015). 
 298. The additional requirement of a qualified-shareholder majority addresses the 
likelihood that activist shareholders may still be able to pressure directors into 
initiating board destaggering—even once they are deprived of the bargaining power 
arising from the combination of precatory proposals and withhold campaigns. Further, 
this proposal also encompasses incentivizing mechanisms for opting back into the 
staggered board default. Here, the logic should be the opposite of that applied to the 
opt-out regime, as the goal is to facilitate the subsequent adoption of a staggered board. 
For example, approval of a staggering proposal should require a simple majority vote 
by the shareholders. This proposal would be politically feasible because some U.S. states 
have already adopted a regime of quasi-mandatory staggered elections. See supra        
note 38. Elsewhere, we have also documented that (re)incorporation in “managerial 
states” (states with more or more severe antitakeover statutes) is associated with a 
statistically and economically significant increase in firm value, which provides 
additional empirical support for the desirability of this proposal. See Cremers & Sepe, 
supra note 32, at 2-3. 
 299. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 88, at 1073 (proposing a triennial board election); Jacobs, 
supra note 4, at 1662 (proposing a quinquennial board election); Martin Lipton & 
Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of 
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225-30 (1991) (same). 
 300. In addition, with a triennial board, the whole board could be replaced after the 
expiration of the three-year term, which raises issues of continuity in the transmission 
of board information from one election cycle to the other. Conversely, the adoption of 
a staggered board assures continuity of leadership, since at any given time a majority of 
directors will have prior experience with sitting on the company’s board. See supra 
notes 64-65 and accompanying text. Further, given the shorter average holding periods 
and increased turnover that have come to characterize shareholding at most 
companies, see supra note 212, staggered elections seem better suited to ensure investor 
footnote continued on next page 
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But why not adopt a straight mandatory rule? After all, if the risk of ex 
post destaggering destroys the value of staggered boards, turning staggering 
provisions into a mandatory requirement could appear as a logical normative 
conclusion. This Article argues, however, that a quasi-mandatory rule—which 
would prevent shareholders from coercing the board into approving 
destaggering, but would not preclude the company from destaggering upon the 
voluntary agreement of the board—is preferable. This Article asserts that the 
promotion of long-term specific investments and the related need to ensure 
optimal stakeholder investments are the primary channels through which a 
staggered board increases firm value.301 Under this line of reasoning, it is still 
possible that there will be a subset of companies for which destaggering could 
pass a social cost-benefit threshold. For example, liquidity needs could persuade 
directors to accept the requests of prospective investors to destagger the board 
in exchange for the injection of much-needed capital.302 Another theoretical 
possibility is that a firm’s production could be so standardized as to make long-
term specific investments marginal. While in today’s competitive 
environment this possibility seems unlikely, one cannot rule it out altogether. 
More generally, the existence of some residual level of heterogeneity among 
corporations needs to be taken into account, and thus setting an inalterable 
rule is ill advised.  
Finally, we are aware of the practical difficulties that this Article’s proposal 
to turn staggered boards into a quasi-mandatory provision is likely to 
encounter in the current political environment. In its strongest version, this 
proposal would require coordinated actions involving the SEC (to reform   
Rule 14a-8) and the individual states, whose laws govern corporate voting 
procedures. Nonetheless, a critical first step toward attempting future reform 
intervention necessarily involves reeducating regulators as to the 
considerations that better serve the interests of shareholders and society as a 
whole. The framework of analysis offered in this Article, and the conclusion it 
achieves, should prove useful to that end by providing policymakers with 
tangible reasons for reconsidering the current direction of corporate 
governance policies. 
 
representation at the board level, providing new investors with the yearly opportunity 
to appoint a slate of directors to the board. Finally, while this Article’s empirical 
evidence documents the value-increasing effect of staggered boards, no empirical 
evidence exists on triennial (or quinquennial) board terms, as they have to date never 
been implemented in the United States. 
 301. See supra Part IV.A.  
 302. See Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 317, 358 (2013) (suggesting that the need for funding in start-ups 
and financially distressed corporations tends to represent the first-order problem and 
may justify large concessions to investors). 
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Conclusion 
Among the various interdisciplinary approaches embraced by the U.S. 
legal academy, the intersection between law and economics has emerged as 
perhaps “the most widespread and unitary.”303 In the study of business 
organizations, that intersection has grown into a symbiosis, bringing about “as 
thorough a revolution . . . as can be imagined, in scholarship and in practice, 
methodology, and organization.”304 That revolution began in 1976 with the 
publication of “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure,” by Michael Jensen and William Meckling.305 Jensen 
and Meckling’s article introduced a new principal-agent model of the firm, 
which continues to provide the dominant paradigm of analysis used in 
contemporary corporate law scholarship. The model’s use of simple 
assumptions has made it largely accessible and has ensured its “lasting impact 
on the thinking of corporate law academics.”306 However, the enthusiasm for 
the straightforward economic logic enabled by those assumptions has 
oversimplified the application of economics to corporate law. As is well known 
in economic theory, there are many reasons why the real world departs from 
the assumptions in Jensen and Meckling’s model:  
1) [I]n general, markets are not . . . Pareto efficient; 2) markets may not clear;          
3) markets may not exist, or when they exist, may be thin; 4) rents are pervasive, 
and indeed, . . . necessary to ensure that high quality products get produced, that 
workers do not shirk, and so on; 5) even when there are many participants in a 
market, competition may be highly imperfect . . . .307 
Taking these departures into account is not merely about academic rigor. 
Drawing on the simplified outline of corporate relationships provided by the 
principal-agent model, shareholder advocates have attempted to vindicate the 
optimality of shareholder empowerment. But the move from the partial 
equilibrium framework of Jensen and Meckling to a general equilibrium 
framework shows that such vindication is theoretically lacking. In incomplete 
markets, shareholders emerge as uninformed and improperly incentivized, 
 
 303. Jonathan R. Macey, Law and the Social Sciences, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172 (1997) 
(footnote omitted); see also Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous 
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 767-68 (1987) (noting that in many 
important legal fields the “economic perspective either is already dominant or will 
soon be”). 
 304. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 342 (2005). 
 305. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 70. 
 306. Romano, supra note 305, at 347.  
 307. Joseph Stiglitz, Post Walrasian and Post Marxian Economics, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 109 
(1993) (footnote omitted); see also Allen & Strine, supra note 68, at 1383-84 (explaining 
that, at an academic meeting held in London in 2004, Michael Jensen himself had come 
to concur with the view “that security mispricing, instead of being a temporary self-
correcting problem, was, under current circumstances, a problem that could and had 
spiraled out of control”). 
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fundamentally challenging the view that they are optimally situated to make 
decisions that maximize firm value.308  
Subjecting the theoretical assertions that underpin the shareholder-
empowerment claim to empirical evaluation—exploiting the primary 
advantage of the law and economics method over other interdisciplinary 
approaches309—does not help the shareholder-empowerment argument either. 
Instead, the new empirical evidence produced by this Article suggests that it is 
time to reverse the j’accuse of shareholder advocates.310  
Once market imperfections are taken fully into account, it is the received 
board-centric model of U.S. corporate law that emerges as economically 
rational. Under that model, the board retains formal authority over the 
corporation. This Article has shown—theoretically and empirically—that the 
value of this structure arises from the board’s ability to perform tasks that the 
shareholders cannot. Only the board can guarantee to a corporation’s managers 
and various stakeholders a commitment to long-term value creation—one that 
benefits, not hurts, shareholders.  
In 1937, Ronald Coase famously explained that firms emerge when it is 
efficient to substitute an “organizing authority”—in more modern terms, a 
“governance structure”311—for market contracting coordinated by the price 
system.312 Parties choose these “islands of conscious power” over the market’s 
“ocean of unconscious cooperation” when marketing costs—we would say 
market imperfections—exceed the benefits of using the price mechanisms.313 In 
a sense, board authority emerges as a valuable correction to the limitations of 
the market’s “invisible hand.”314 
With its strong focus on board authority and the central discretionary 
function of management over capital,315 the received legal model of U.S. 
corporations has always aimed, very successfully, at internalizing market 
imperfections long before they took center stage in modern economics. The 
attempt of shareholder advocates to subject that model to the logic of discrete 
market contracting by shifting authority from boards to markets risks 
 
 308. See supra Part III.A. 
 309. See Macey, supra note 304, at 172; Romano, supra note 305, at 346. 
 310. See supra notes 14-15, 102 and accompanying text.  
 311. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1539 (1981) (emphasis omitted). 
 312. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 404 (1937). 
 313. See id. at 388, 390-92 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)). 
 314. See CHANDLER, supra note 1, at 1. 
 315. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
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undermining what seems to be the real genius of American corporate law316: its 
historically empowered boards. 
  
 
 316. Cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1, 4-5 (1993) 
(arguing that “[t]he genius of American corporate law is in its federalist organization,” 
which allows for incorporation competition among states). 
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Appendix Table A 
Definitions of Variables 
Appendix Table A presents brief definitions of the main variables that appear 
in the analysis. All continuous variables are winsorized at one percent in both 
tails.  
Dependent Variables:   
Q 
Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of 
assets (i.e., Total Assets – Book Equity + 
Market Equity) divided by the book 
value of assets. Calculation follows Fama 
and French (1992).317 Source of data is 
Compustat annual data file.  
Independent and Interacted Variables:  
Staggered Board 
Indicator variable equal to one (zero 
otherwise) if the board is staggered. Data 
is obtained from Cremers and Ferrell 
(2014)318 for 1978-1989, and from Risk 
Metrics, SharkRepellent.net, and hand 
collection for 1990-2011. 
Staggering Up 
Dummy equal to one after the firm has 
adopted a staggered board (and only as 
long as the firm does not subsequently 
destagger). 
Staggering Down 
Dummy equal to one after the firm has 
removed a staggered board (and only as 
long as the firm does not subsequently 
stagger up again). 
Assets Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
CAPX Capital Expenditures / Total Assets. 
 
 317. See Fama & French, supra note 17. 
 318. See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 139. 
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Contract Specificity 
Industry-level measure of the 
fraction of inputs (i.e., products and 
services) that are not sold on an 
organized exchange or reference 
priced in a trade publication, made 
available at Nunn’s website for 
1997.319  
Delaware Incorporation Indicator variable if the company is incorporated in Delaware.  
E-Index 
Sum of six governance provisions 
indicators (including the staggered 
board) in the corporate charter or 
bylaws introduced by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009).320  
E-Index (without SB) 
Sum of five governance provisions 
indicators (not including the 
staggered board) in the corporate 
charter or bylaws introduced by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009).321 The E-Index proper 
includes all six provisions, including 
the staggered board. 
Firm Age 
Natural logarithm of firm age. The 
age is calculated as the length of time 
in years since the first year the 
company appeared in the CRSP 
database. 
G-Index 
Sum of twenty-four governance 
provisions indicators (including the 
staggered board) in the corporate 
charter or bylaws introduced by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003).322  
 
 319. See sources cited supra note 267. 
 320. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 110. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See Gompers et al., supra note 109.  
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G-Index (without SB) 
Sum of twenty-three governance 
provisions indicators (not including 
the staggered board) in the corporate 
charter or bylaws introduced by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003).323 The G-Index proper 
includes all twenty-four provisions, 
including the staggered board. 
Industry M&A Volume 
The ratio of mergers and 
acquisitions’ dollar volume in SDC to 
the total market capitalization from 
CRSP for a calendar year, as per a 
given Fama-French 49 industry. The 
CRSP annual industry market 
capitalization is for ordinary stocks 
only and excludes ADRs and REITs. 
If no M&A activity per given 
industry year is reported in SDC, we 
assume it to be zero. We include 
transactions where buyer achieves 
control of the target.  
Insider Ownership 
The insider ownership in year t is the 
percentage of shares owned by 
insiders from all shares. Data is 
collected from Compact Disclosure 
for 1986-2006. We supplement these 
data with the ownership by the top 
management team from ExecuComp 
for 2007-2011. From ExecuComp, we 
use the total shares owned by the top 
five officers of the firm. 
Intangible Assets (Total Assets – Net Property Plan & Equipment) / (Total Assets). 
Labor Productivity 
Industry-level measure of the 
marginal product of labor, from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (using 
the four-digit SIC code). 
 
 323. See id. 
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Large Customer 
Indicator variable set equal to one if 
the firm has at least one customer 
accounting for ten percent or more 
of its sales, from Compustat Segment 
data. 
R&D R&D expenditures / Sales. 
ROA EBITDA / Total Assets. 
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Appendix Table B 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 
Appendix Table B presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent 
and independent variables, as well as the interacting variables. 
 
Dependent: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Q 1.58 1.29 0.87 0.72 4.66 30,797 
Independent: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Staggered Board 0.53 1 0.5 0 1 30,797 
Staggering Up 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 30,797 
Staggering Down 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 30,797 
Assets 7.29 7.17 1.56 4.55 11.05 30,797 
CAPX 0.06 0.05 0.05 0 0.2 30,797 
Contract  
Specificity 
0.91 0.97 0.14 0.15 1 9628 
Delaware  
Incorporation 0.55 1 0.5 0 1 30,797 
E-Index 1.84 2 1.28 1 6 28,029 
E-Index  
(without SB) 1.28 1 1.01 1 5 28,029 
Firm Age 2.87 3 0.98 0 4.45 30,797 
G-Index 8.24 8 3.36 1 19 28,357 
G-Index  
(without SB) 7.73 8 3.14 1 18 28,357 
Industry M&A 
Volume 
0.027 0.01 0.05 0 0.359 30,797 
Insider  
Ownership 0.07 0.03 0.1 0 1 21,216 
Intangible 
Assets 0.64 0.68 0.24 0.04 1 27,519 
Labor  
Productivity 1.41 1.05 0.62 0.49 2.9 24,880 
Large Customer 0.17 0 0.37 0 1 30,797 
R&D 0.03 0 0.06 0 0.23 30,797 
ROA 0.14 0.14 0.08 -0.05 0.32 30,797 
 
